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MAUBICE FRANCIS EGAN:
WRITER} TEACHER, DIPLOMAT

INTRODUCTION
Despite the existence of a large Irish minority in Amer
ican society for well over a century, it was not until John
F* Kennedy’s election to the Presidency in November 1960 that
most Americans became aware of or interested in the roles
their Irish Catholic fellow citizens had played in United
States history since they first began to arrive in appreci.able numbers in the 1840’s .

In fact, the subject was not

s
,;teven comprehensively researched until 1963s when William V.
.^Shannon's The American Irish was published,,

This work was

4 the first major attempt to analyze perceptively the more than
one and one-quarter centuries of American social history as
:it was lived by immigrant Irishmen and their descendants.
According to Shannon, although the Irish had succeeded in
exerting influence in local government and local events dur
ing the decades immediately following the Civil War, as late
as 1932 the Irish were no further advanced in national polltics than they had been a century before, despite their ea
gerness and determination to become more Involved.

With one

lonely exception, no Irish American Catholics had been ap
pointed to positions of importance In the executive or judi
cial .branches of the Federal Government prior to Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s presidency,

The most that was given to them was

an occasional diplomatic appointment or second-rank patron**
age. office.

"Typical,-11 Shannon stated, "was Maurice Egan,

the man of letters whom Theodore Roosevelt named Minister to
Denmark in T907*”*
Maurice Francis Egan was the author's great-grandfather,
and with the opportunities which this relationship gave, it
was possible to research further the life and contributions
of the man who received special notice in Shannonfs book.
Egan, enjoyed not one but three successful careers —

as a

writer, a teacher, and a diplomat for three presidents —
^taring his seventy-two years.

Because of his special talents

'Jhe was successful in each of these fields despite his member
ship by birth in America's Irish Catholic community.

His

rise to fame was unique because he did not shun his minority
^background; rather he used it as a vehicle to attain his
^goals, and at the same time, gain acceptance by the White,
Anglo-Saxon, Protestant social system which prevailed in the
United States during his lifetime.

In literature he first

published in Catholic periodicals until he made a name for
himself and his work was welcomed by secular periodicals; in
journalism he was a strong voice in the Catholic press in Hew
York.and became known to Richard Watson Gilder, Egan's even
tual link to the White House; as a teacher he joined the fac
ulties of the University of Notre- Dame and of Catholic Univer
sity of America and gained renown as a reformer and a man of

1William V. Shannon, The American Irish (New .York,
1963), p. 327-

letters.

Soon he became a sought-after guest in Washington

society.

Kis life was noteworthy In that he turned unfavor

able circumstances and social obstacles into avenues for suc
cess, thereby setting an example for the other members of the
Irish Catholic community in America,

CHAPTER I
EGAH:

TOI TEE ABE TEACHER

Egan liras "born in Philadelphia on May 24, 1852,

Except

for the information contained, in his memoirs, little is known
.ahout his parents or early years.

Egan said that his father,

Maurice Egan, emigrated to Philadelphia from Tipperary in the
late 1820’s, well before the potato famine drove scores of
?| M s countrymen to seek refuge on the Borth American continent.
^Maurice E g a n ’s motive for leaving his homeland is a mystery.
.-■All that is related to us is that he accompanied a wealthy
t>uncle with whom.he soon quarreled and parted ways.1
-father was an amiable, well-mannered,

Egan's

sympathetic man with a

fil1'democratic love of all people," a trait which his son seemed
to have inherited.

E g a n ’s mother, Americ a n - b o m Margaret

MacMuXIen, was depicted, as a beautiful, cultivated and re
fined woman who, in contrast to her spouse, was preoccupied
with social distinctions.-^
These contrasting personalities of Egan’s parents*

'Maurice Francis Egan, Recollections of a Happy Life
(Hew York, 1924), p. 17. HeTe^teF^ETs'lTorir^illbe cited
as Recollections.

rooted in Irish and European culture and imbued with the vig
orous spirit and refinement of early American urban life, had
profound effects on the child who arrived in the thirteenth
year of their marriage.

As his life progressed and his per

sonality developed, it appears that Egan acquired the best
attributes of both personalities and used them effectively
to facilitate his advancement.

If we are to believe Egan,

exposure to his father1s ways made him a creative thinker,
while his mother’s measured dignity and conservatism in social
matters cultivated in him extremely conventional habits in
dress, deportment, and behavior and made him a stickler for
adherence to established behavior in etiquette and protocol
matters.^
E g a n ’s Philadelphia boyhood was spent in a well-superl^ised, "hot-house environment. n

Egan enjoyed a small amount

$$?,. freedom for a while, but it ended abruptly when his mother
became a Homan Catholic.

Intensely devoted to her new re

ligion, Margaret Egan believed her son should be brought up
in .surroundings that would permit him to develop a similar
-deep faith.

Her. method was to guard him, almost fanatically

at times, from every possible threat to his religious devel
opment .

She exercised such rigid control over every aspect

of iris life in her zealousness to imbue him with an intense
religious fervor that Egan concluded that his "business in
life was to be a martyr.

h b i d . , p. 41.
pIbid., p. 39.

She chose all of his activities,

each of his companions, and his first school —
Parochial School —
most in her mind.
her scrutiny.

St. Phillip’s

with the development of his .faith fore
Even his reading material did not escape

Instead of fairy tales and other children's

stories,’which Egan probably would have preferred,

she enter-

taiued him with readings from her favorite classics.
Several of these efforts had beneficial side effects.
Mrs. Egan's readings cultivated Egan's Interest In good lit
erature and kindled in him a desire to be a writer himself,
a desire which was-to be the foundation of one successful
.career and lead to the others.

The selection of St. Phillip1

fsehool. proved to be fortunate, too.

Egan's contact there

p i t h a tough gang of Irish stevedores' sons tended to offset
the effects of his overly protected home life.

Generally,

Mrs. Egan's efforts failed to accomplish her primary goal.
>'ln fact, they had somewhat of an opposite effect.

Egan devel

oped a maverick spirit in thought, though not In deed, event
ually reacting against her religious views.

In his later

years in particular, he became quite critical of the typical
;Irish-Catholic conservative beliefs and-practices prevailing
In .the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Homan
Catholic Church in the .United States.

(His reaction and

criticism were never quite intense enough to cause him to
break his religious ties, however; he remained a practicing
Catholic throughout his life.)

6Ibid,, p. 47.

English composition was Egan’s test academic subjects
both at St. Phillip’s and at La Salle College, where he attended high school as well as college.

At La Salle, however,

Egan found that his talent was not always recognized.

One

teacher gave him a low grade because he thought E g a n ’s work
was too good to have been original.

Infuriated by the grade,

Egan challenged the instructor to cite the work from which
Egan had supposedly plagiarised.

The instructor could no.t.

To prove he was capable, Egan suggested that he be locked in
a room for an. hour and allowed to write.

The teacher admit-

.^ tea his mistake when Egan emerged with a worthy composition.
A few pieces of E gan’s were published while he was
& young, hat his first literary success came at seventeen when

App 1 e ton 's Jo urnal accepted his essay w0n-Roses. w

Though a

^ m e r e synthesis of other texts, it gained Egan a considerable
.^ramount of recognition in Catholic literary circles.
After he completed his formal education, Egan was pri
vately tutored for a time.

Then to please his father, he

began to study law in the office of Philadelphia attorney
/John I. Rogers.

But law did not really appeal to him and
Q
a literary career remained his chief ambition.
So strong,

In fact, was his urge to continue writing that even while
studying law he earned spending money by acting as the ’’Lon
don, Paris, and Rome correspondent’1 of a local paper, ’’the

7

■Sunday Globe.11 When the paper went bankrupt, Egan's father
was horrified to hear his son confess in court, to become a
preferred creditor, that he had been such a versatile corQ
respondent.
Besides his ’’foreign dispatches” during this
period, Egan also wrote a novel which was published in Henry
Peterson's Saturday Evening Post, the first of a great many
contributions to that magazine, and three sonnets which were
accepted by Scribner1s .

Despite his literary diversions,

Egan worked hard to fulfill his father's desires that he be
come a lawyer.

Eventually though, he dropped 1aw altogether

to return to school.
.

In 1873? Egan, now twenty-one, went to Georgetown Col-

iege in Washington, D.C., for graduate study.

In return for

,room and board, he also taught several courses, the merit of
Which he later questioned.

It was during this period that

he had his first real taste of politics.

He became aware,

too, of

the Capital's diplomatic circle,

meeting social iy

many of

the diplomats with whom he would

later come info con

tact officially.^

Despite these diversions, Egan’s four

years at Georgetown were restless ones.

Finally in 1877 he

left the school to travel to the southwestern United States
to investigate the estate of his maternal granduncle Don Juan
MacMullen, who as one of the early Texas empresarios had
.

started
i

mi I'

f c n a a a t a ^in

.

w
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several colonies of Irishmen there in the early niner w 11n an

n m ^ r i m

p. 58.
10Ibid., pp. 57-60.
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teenth century.

During the trip Egan, continued his writing,

periodically sending vignettes about his journey to various
eastern papers. 11
The journey had a profound and lasting effect on Egan's
life.

It was at this,time, during the many hours the trip

gave him to reflect about his future,, that Egan decided to
pursue a literary career and was prompted to accept an offer
to edit McGeefs Weekly, a Catholic magazine based in Hew York
City.

Egan was also moved to accept the position by a second

"consideration-.

It would give him the opportunity to live in

cosmopolitan Hew York, the nation's literary capital.

Hav

ing tasted a cosmopolitan environment while in Washington,
D.Qvs Egan was most anxious to avoid returning to and settling
in a. relatively provincial city like Philadelphia.

12

•V Egan's modest reputation as a writer and poet had pre
ceded. him and he was well received in Hew York.

Plunging

immediately into the work of editing McGee*s Weekly, he was
so busy from April 187 8 to March 1879 that he had little time
for other literary activity.

Egan learned newspaper work

quickly, and soon James A. McGee, the paper's proprietor,
turned over most of the work to him.

13

The absence of a

copyright law allowed Egan to ftspice~upn the heretofore drab
paper by lifting articles bodily from other publications and

by inventing clever captions for the pictures he pilfered.
In his Hecollec11ons he "brushed aside the fact that several
times lie erred and his captions did not come remotely near
to describing accurately the illustrations they accompanied.
But Egan was rightfully proud that during his editorship
McGee !s tfeekly became one of the more Important Homan Catholic

r » i iin >* n m —rniriin iirii-TTr'iiniMirwffiTrrniirwi^wii

■

diocesan journals in the United States,

14

Because he felt overworked and unappreciated, Egan re
signed in March 1879 and returned temporarily to Philadelphia.
He went back to Hew York in December 1879 to become assis
tant editor of Patrick V. Hickey *s Catholic Review.

This pe~

■;riodical was an innovator in the field of Oatholic journalism
because it did not direct itself to the Irish Oatholic ele- ments. in American society and was not involved in political
and theological polemics.

Egan attempted to liberalize the

;^.publication further, but despite his progressive attitudes
toward publishing, Hickey balked at any attempts to change
the journal*s editorial policies.

Egan believed the editor

had nsecluded himself within a Chinese wall, the portals of
which were guarded by the honourable members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy In Ireland.”

15

Continued disagreement with Hickey compelled Egan to
leave the Review in January 1881 to become associate editor
-

■ ■ ij i»iM'iiJMJ*mu i W

i iimi'iiH H f Hum

him

w fn u ik ,al u m n i

^ F r a n k Luther Mott, History of American Magazines,
Vol. Ill (Cambridge, 1.93B)7pTT97“
1^Recollections, P « 1 1 8 .

12
of the Fre©man’s Journal, the foremost Catholic paper In Hew
1£
York.
The decision proved to be a fortunate one for Egan’s
literary development.

His journalistic experience grew con

siderably at the Journal, and it was probably under the Jour-

nal*s redoubtable editor and part owner* James A. McMaster,

17

...that Egan developed fully his talent for literary criticism
which.was to put him in great demand as a book reviewer in
later years,

Egan’s unquenchable sense of humor and his

'■adaptability were invaluable assets to him while working on
the Journal.

The firey McMaster, whose invective was as bit18
ter jae his unlimited vocabulary could make it,
spared no
one1who differed with him, making daily work under him an.
often frustrating experience.

^^Mott, History of American Magazines, Vol. IV (Cam
bridge* 1957
~
17
;<■ ' Thomas F. Meehan, ”James A, McMaster,” The Oatholic
Vol. IV (Hew York, 1910), p, 50o7 Meehan de
scribed McMaster as follows: Although sound on fundamental
issues and principles, his primary weakness was fault find
ing.
In politics he was a States3 Eights Democrat and antiabolitlonist who took a very active and Influential part in
the..great national controversies which raged before the Oivil
War.
His editorial assaults on Lincoln during the Har caused
him to be imprisoned at Fort Lafayette for eleven months as
a disloyal citizen.
The Freeman’s Journal was suppressed by
the government and did not resume publication until April
19, 1862. McMaster then adopted a milder tone in politics
but- in everything else his old style remained.
But with the
advent of modern newspaper methods and the decline of per
sonal journalism a new generation with new ideals tired of
McMaster 1b literary violence and his once widespread pres
tige .and Influence waned.
The whims and idiosyncracies of
the old man, who grew more and more difficult to manage as
the end of his curious and stormy career drew to a close,
still■cramped and hampered the paper.
gartgitfcngwia n n >

McMaster died in December 1886* and Egan became the sole
editor of the Freeman’s Journal until September 1888, when he
left its staff to assume a teaching position at the University
of Uotre Dame.

The paper’s editorial policies changed little

under E g a n ’s editorship.

Egan continued the paper’s firm sup

port fox' President Grover Cleveland, a support which was so
strong, in fact, that in 1884 the paper had backed Cleveland’s
bid for the presidency even though most of its Irish Catholic
readers were expected to vote for Blaine because of his strong
ties with their community.

Egan, for instance, resolutely

stood behind the Democratic President In the furor which de~»
ifV^loped-when Cleveland attempted to return captured Confed
e r a t e battle flags to several southern states.

He published

an editorial supporting the President’s position and a com--,
alimentary letter from a Union veteran who was himself seek?:|p.g to return three Confederate battle flags to veterans of
VBIckett ’s division at a Gettysburg Battle commemoration eer
ie*
»
emony. ^ During the early months of Cleveland's unsuccessful
1888 campaign,. Egan attempted to sway public opinion in favor
of Cleveland, the incumbent President, by publishing numer
ous pro-Cleveland articles and editorials as well as a state
ment by Cleveland’s mother-in-law refuting the much publicized
charge that the President beat his young wife,

20

Cleveland

19 yre email *s Jo urnal, June 25, 1887, p. 4.
I am indebted
to Mr, Sear, Timothy Murphy for all citations from this period
ical.

20Ibid., June 9, 1888, p. 4.
•o c A a M a o e

■*’

was eo impressed by this support that he wrote a ccmpllmen•tary letter to Egan in an effort to insure continuation of
Egan Is and the papei^s backing.

Egan had already left for

Notre Dame by the time the letter was dispatched* however,
and was unable to give the President the pledge he sought,
though in his reply Egan did offer to assist the President1s
campaign in Indiana.

21

As editor, Egan also continued to focus the Journal*s
attention on topics involving the Oatholic Church and to de
vote a great deal of Its space to news about Ireland, a prac
tice Instituted by McMaster to cater to New York's large
JCrish population.

It was during this time that Egan made his

sftew comments on nineteenth century Irish internal politics,
a subject he seldom touched on again.

In various editorials,

Jpgan indicated he favored the cause of Charles Stewart ParhisX! and the Irish Home Rule movement.
Representative of his
\
views were his comments prompted by the infamous Phoenix
Park murders, May 6* 1882;

"No excuse can be made for the

intolerable tyranny and oppression which left up to the Irish
op
only-one weapon, that of conspiracy.”
Egan also took swipes
at -the English whenever possible to please the paper’s IrishAmerican readership.

One of. the better examples of his anti-

British sarcasm was written when he learned of a sermon in
which an Episcopalian minister in New York extolled Queen
tnrfT—T[7'J
Tm~fmifr*in—t
i hrnnr-n-rTm-niiim mim■r~r—i
Tf
iininran«YfcTn n-nTrrmwirr«~n>fwinMnnrmrrnrrwrrrwntv■nnmiiirTirmrTnnTi'iHiiirTmTrmmn1.1>iWi»inp<miminirnirinnTiiTni
t
i
r-uiwirin
i
rnnri—imnnnrr^rimrrrmi
^ Recollections, pp. 181-182.
^Freeian's Journal, July 21, 1888; July 28, 1888.
mui — ip to -tt

Hir in g w i n n r r i i r i mranniTu " i iiiW -> imw ih ii >mi;
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Victoria "as a model for all womankind-.

"Is it really true,”

Egan retorted editorially in the Journal, "that domestic virtue is such a rarity among us that we should all grovel in
abject, idiotic admiration at the feet of this fat, selfish
and ugly old woman, because, for all we know to the contrary,
0*2

she has never broken the Sixth Commandment?” ^
Egan's decision to leave the Journal in the fall of 1888
and take a teaching post at Notre Seme was motivated by his
desire to perfect his legitimate literary skills, especially
hie prose writing. . Egan's nine years in New York City had
not,been devoted entirely to -Journalism.

Even though news

paper work was the craft which provided his living, Egan
s t p i managed to find time for the more respected literary
pursuits.

When he first arrived in New York, for instance,

Egan Joined the literary circle led by Richard Watson Gilder,
assistant editor of Scribner's.

(Egan s entree to this

group was provided by Scribner's publication of several of
his sonnets some yea.rs earlier.)

Gradually, Egan became

fully accepted as a regular member of Gilder's literary cir
cle, where he met and became friendly with such renowned
> r i w im i

i iirrir-n n n iin im in n ~ —iiiim fl-ip imiiiiMm in iiiw n r n i[i'»T nii« w i n i »n ' -mtrm ir»iTiiwT Tr~MiiiiiW i»n Mi mu

«■■■<

i fci i

. n n nf i . .........

23rbld,, July 2, 1887, p. 4.
pA

It was Gilder who in later years, as editor of the
Century Magazine, successor to Scribner's, made’ that publicatidn^he' ieading literary journal in the country.
It was
also Gilder, who as the friend and confidant of Grover Cleve
land, was Egan's link with the White House in the years of
the Cleveland administrations.
It was also Gilder who intro
duced Egan to Theodore Roosevelt in 1901.
Recollections, pp.
106, 114.
t.

/**

*

„

%
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authors of the da7 as William Dean Howells, Henry James, and
Brander Matthews.

Egan continued to have his work published

by Scribner 1s and then by Century.

Gradually, his literary

stature grew and he branched out, contributing extensively to
the Borth American Review, Harper's Magazine, and the hew York
i~nn wrfrt'Tr*tMi 1riTrrv m ntr»irt ■ rwMj'ni i.hiiimiinwirrmi'-ir

T- T - r r^A,.-.^—

a , w a w «»»i*»B.,
« 55&acz*agcEaiMW

Times book review columns as well as to numerous Catholic pe~

■gfflSwTWBJTH’gBaECa**

25
riodicals and, occasionally, to Charies Danafs Hew York Sun.
He wrote so prolifically during these hectic years between
1881 and 1 8 8 8 , in fact, that at his peak he averaged 1 0 , 0 0 0
to 1 5 * 0 0 0 words a week on widely diversified subjects.

26

Eganfs literary efforts were not restricted solely to
.articles, essays, and book reviews.
novel as well.

He tried poetry and the

His first volume of poems in particular showed

promise but after several years and several new publications
of his verse, Egan had still not completely fulfilled the
•critics* original expectations.

According to Critic Walter

lecky, Egan published too quickly to take sufficient time to
polish and pex*fect his work.

Moreover, Egan had the misfor

tune to be a pioneer in American Catholic literature.

His

P 0 sms app ealed primarily to a distinct class and failed to
attract proper critical attention, so he was unable to obtain
the type of criticism he needed to improve his work.

With

some bitterness, Lecky saw the position Egan was in.

’’The

^-Recollections, p. 114. Dana said of Egan and William
Dean Howells that they were "the only Americans who wrote a
good English style!"
2 6 T]3id., p. 157.
aseaerwj,?3SBm

class to which Mr. Egan belongs has no criticism to offer .
. . ,“ he wrote.

“If an author’s book sells? his name is

blazoned forth in half a hundred headless petty journals.
Eis most glaring defects become through their glasses mystic
beauty spots . * . . .A clique grows around him, whose duty
Is to puff the master.

It is such reasons as these that

have limited the scope and dwarfed the really fine genius of
27
Maurice Egan.”

Egan,,too, saw that the American Oatholic

literature of the 1880‘s was "anaemic/1 but it is doubtful
whether he realized that he himsel-f was a victim of its dis
eased state, especially since he had attained some success
wlfhrhis shorter poems, notably his sonnets.

In these works,

EgapVs scope was broader and his touch more firm: here existed
the mastery of. musical expression which was lacking in his
longer^poems.

Even the critical Lecky acknowledged, in 1895*

that1.Egan was “at the head of the younger American school of
poets.
While E g a n 1s poetry was romantic and idealistic, his
novels treated topics that were wholly realistic and they
•exemplify the trends which were shaping American literature,
•especially the American novel, during these years,

E gan’s

novels dealt mostly with Irish-American -- but not always
Oatholic —

life.

Generally, they were set against back

grounds of drab, everyday surroundings and filled with mi-

.^^Walter Lecky, Down at Caxton‘s (Baltimore,
60-61 .
Ibid., p. 62.

1895), pp.

18
nutely detailed real-life characters through whose lives Egan
protested the evils of the times.

Egan's novels, character

istic of the works of social protest which became prevalent
in the 1890's, bear out Commager1s statement, in The American
Mind,- that""the whole panel of lesser novelists of the Roo■nnnrinrn n m in

sevelt“Wilson era, however they differed in background and
training, united' with Howells and Herrick and Churchill in
pronouncing a verdict of guilty against American business and
29
businessmen of this generation."
Throughout his Hew York years, Egan, unfortunately, wrote
under great pressures:

the pressure of conflicting obliga30
tions -to employer and family,
and the pressure of his many
slid varied literary interests and pursuits.

He was so act

ive as a poet, novelist, essayist, and book reviewer, in ad
dition to making his living as a journalist, that he was un
able to achieve complete mastery in any of these literary
forms though he was an adequate, often entertaining novelist
and prominent among the minor poets of his day.

31

He simply

never worked -long enough in any one particular literary craft
’to develop the skill which can be obtained only from constant,

^ B e n r y Steele Commager, The American Mind (Hew Haven,
1950), pp. 257-258.
Actually, Egan condemned the economic
system most vociferously and joined the ranks of what ComPiager called the "literature of Revolt" chiefly in his later
novels, especially The Ivy Hedge .(191A ) , which abounds with,
characters caught up in the social issues of the day.
.

y
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30
^ Egan had married Katharine Mullin of Philadelphia In
S ep tsmbe r 1880.
lecky, 0£ e cit., pp. HA-5 6 .

devoted, often arduous practice.

He did not have the time

necessary to do so, even though he possessed the desire..

It

is easy to understand, then, why the Hotre Dame offer was so
attractive to him —

with its salary increase and leisure

time for writing.
Life at South Bend was exactly what Egan had hoped for.
His income was adequate for small—town living and his position
as professor of English, literature gave him the time he needed
to write.

Furthermore, he gained personal satisfaction from

the direction he was able to give the University as it sought
33
-to liberalize and broaden its curriculum."
In the classroom
■he was left entirely free to. teach as he desired, so much so
^ h a t he felt that perhaps he had been “spoiled by the kindly
34
opinion that whatever he did was sure to be right.”*
leaching at Oatholic University, to which Egan trans
ferred in 1896, was quite a contrast.

The “academic” free

d o m which permeated Notre fame did not exist at this insti
tution, which had served exclusively for the education of
priests until 1889 when its school of philosophy was first

^ T h e bulk of Egan's novels and textbooks were written
during this decade at Notre Lame.
Some of the titles follow;
Disappearance of John Longworthy (Notre Lame, 1 8 9 0 ; First
Steps in the Sciences,with Object Lessons,. translation and
adaptation~of Paul Bert (New Yo rk5~T8BB'71 How They Worked
Their Way,., and:Other Tales: , Stories of Luty^TNe^r-York, 1 8 9 2 );
^Success o ? Patri ckT Le smond (Notre Lamer~T893) ; A Gentleman
(New York, T B 9 3 7 ; A.Marriage of Reason (Baltimore, 1 8 9 3 7 7 ^
1
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opened to laymen.

Instead, its conservative faculty and

administration were bound to stuffy academic traditions dic
tated by the beliefs of the Church.

The school had actively

sought Egan for its staff because he was a prominent, wellqualified Catholic and it would hire no one but a member of
the Church.

Egan had not particularly wanted the job.

He

had been quite happy at South Bend and was not anxious to re
turn to Washington, which he believed was a poor place to
raise children.

But Mrs. Egan pressed for the change because

she longed to return to Washington's cosmopolitan way of life
and Egan finally gave in and accepted a post as one of the
>v
33
ebllege’s two professors of English.
Regrettably, strong undercurrents of conflict between
old and new philosophies of education existed at Catholic
University at this time, and Egan gradually became disen
chanted with the conservative leadership of the school.

In

creasingly, he sought outside literary contacts and interests
even though his lectures demanded a great deal of preparation
He served as a correspondent for a London weekly paper and
contributed frequently to various literary magazines.

Re

quests for his articles and stories increased greatly after
the successful publication in Century of a collection of
short stories called The Wiles of Sexton Maginnis, which
satirized the Irish-Catholic viewpoint of various current
sub j e c t s.^

35Ibld., pp. 177-180, 185.
^ The stories were popular and In 1909 they were pub
lished in book form.

Ega n’s outside activities,, however, were not restricted
to literary interests while tie taught at Catholic- University®
Two old college friends, William E. Harriety, chairman of the
Democratic Rational Committee.in 1 8 9 6 , and Senator Thomas
Garter of Montana, chairman of the Republican Rational Comittittee in 1892, sparked his interest in politics, and while
-he was still on the Catholic University faculty, Egan embarked
on his third and most prestigious career as, in Theodore Roo
sevelt1s words, ”unofficial adviser to . . . three presidents
Q

u

«

e

•
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.*-- Egan's “unofficial’1 relationship with the Presidency

i ^ d actually begun during Cleveland’s second administration.
tin 3893s while Egan was still at Rotre Dame, Cleveland offered
him a xdiplomatic assignment in Athens.

Egan turned down the

•'Position, 'but the offer of a diplomatic post at some future
38
vtime was left open to him for the asking.
Senator Thomas Carter was E g a n ’s link to the White House
-after Egan returned to Washington in 1 8 9 6 .

A good friend and

occasional adviser of McKinley, Carter would often bring Mc
K inley’s problems to Egan for suggestions and advice.

Im

mediately- after they conferred with each other, Carter would
usually meet with the President.

Topics discussed were most

often concerned with developments of law in foreign countries,

-^Recollections, pp. 192-193.
-^Ibid., pp. 181-182,
It was undoubtedly Richard Wat
son Gilder who brought Ega n ’s name to Clevelands attention.
See Rote 24.

a topic cm which Egan could give the foreign viewpoint be
cause of his journalistic contacts in Rome and in France«
Ihe question of the Philippines was widely debated during
the McKinley administration and several conferences were held
between Egan and Carter on the subject of the friars* lands
in those islands . ^

McKinley even suggested that Egan go

unofficially to Rome to assess the entire situation and see
what adjustments of the religious difficulties in the Philip
pines were possible*

Carter mentioned that as a, reward Egan

might be sent to Quirinal as ambassador or made minister to
$he Vatican if such a position ever evolved.

Egan declined

-.outright, however, stating that he had no ambitions whatso-

< James A* LeRoy, Americans in the Philippines, Vol.
U
(liew’ York,
1914), p. 304. Under its Constitution#
the
phited' States government could not succeed to the position
.of the King of Spain as "royal patron of religion" within
’the domains subject to him and could not exercise in the
Philippines the right of appointment to benefices or the
'control of Church property any more than it could pay for
the support of the institutions of the Church. But there
were many thorny questions involved in the decision as to
where the title to some of this property had been vested
and -should .be vested in the future. All this was apart from
the practically more urgent question whether the legal prin
ciple of "prescription” would apply in any and all the cases
of landed estates claimed by the religious orders.
Further
more# there might prove to be merit in the contentions of
many Filipinos that valid titles could not be shown for a
part of the land included within these estates. Moreover,
there were additional legal questions as to whether, even
if the friars had good titles, by prescription cv otherwise,
their alleged transfers of the lands to foreign corporations
in 1898, 18993 and 1900 were valid.
Finally, there was a
practical issue of fact as to whether or not their transfers
were fictitious and designed to facilitate the collection of
rents and enjoyment of other profits from these lands# of
which the former landlords had virtually been deprived since
1896.
a

t \

~Ti~ f W rim iin mn iniiwii i iir m r i hi i~ i mimr mu rrrrn * pirm i » ii mifirnw m n n pin w iMn n v

i i iit n n»iin “~ r iT in

23
ever, for a diplomatic c a r e e r . ^
With Theodore Roosevelt's accession to the Presidency,
Egan became more closely associated with the White House.
The two men had first become acquainted in the 1880 !s, when
Roosevelt, through correspondence, asked Egan to criticize
several of his writings.

The two men found that they had

many common literary likes and dislikes.

They never met per

sonally , however, until Richard Watson Gilder introduced them
4*1
.after Roosevelt had become President.
Their friendship
grew much closer when Robert Lincoln 0'Brien of the Ladies
Home Journal was unable to continue writing a series of "interpretations" of Roosevelt for that magazine.

The President

as&ed Egan to finish the articles, which necessitated several
weekly visits by Egan;to the White House.

After the weekly

sessions were over, Egan continued to be a frequent luncheon
companion of Roosevelt1s, discussing with the President var
ious aspects of literature or one of the President's own re42
cerrt writingsB
1^ - 1—
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^ G r a h a m H. Stuart, American Diplomatic and Consular
Practice (Hew York, 1952)\ p. 133*
See also Recollections,
pp. f82~197? .199* Luring this period, although,
’^o™3oe¥,
^LOt
mention it in his Recollections, Egan must have had some di,rect contact with President McKinley, if only socially, for
in the McKinley Papers there are occasional letters inviting
Egan to various White House functions.
I am indebted to Pro
fessor Richard B. Sherman for these citations from the William
McKinley Papers, Library of Congress, Vol. 132? George M. Cortelyou to Maurice E, Egan, January 10, 1900.
h1
Maurice Erancis Egan, "Theodore Roosevelt in Retro
spect," The Atlantic Monthly (May 1919)? PP. 676-685.
h.n
‘"Recollections, pp. 204-205? 208.
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Like his predecessor, Roosevelt wanted the opinion of a
Catholic layman on the Philippine problem.

Roosevelt found

such a great divergence of opinions among Catholic ecclesi
astics that he wanted counsel from another source.

The legal

difficulties concerning the friars1 lands, above and beyond
the religious ones, were, however, much more complicated than
Egan's simple and naive proposed solution indicated.

Egan

advised .the President to submit the problem to the Pope and
to abide by his.decision.

43

Despite such, questionable advice, a warm relationship
continued to grow between the two men, and in 1906 Roosevelt
appointed Egan as a member of the Indian Commission as a ges44
ture.of friendship.
Since this was only an honorary com
mittee-, Egan believed that his acceptance of the post would
not violate his desire to remain aloof from politics, a de
sire so strong that he had turned down two offers of diplo
matic posts by former administrations because of it.

Egan,

considered the diplomatic corps to be a group of underpaid,
overworked,.public servants whose livelihoods were on the fir
ing line with every presidential election and he wanted no
part of such an existence.

But in June 1907> the ambassador

ship to Japan became vacant, and T*J. O'Brien, the United
States Minister to Denmark, was transferred to the position.

^ Ibid., p p . 201 -202.
It is unclear why their relationship developed.
The
one plausible explanation was their mutual Interest in lit
erature .

25
Roosevelt, wishing to fill the vacancy in Denmark with "a
man who knew equally well the traditions of the old world
and the practices of the new,” asked Egan-to accept the post*
When Egan refused, Roosevelt gave him an ultimatum.

”1 am go

ing down to my little house in Virginia for about a week,"
the President said.

“When I return I expect you to say yes,
45
and I will send you to Copenhagen.”
The decision was difficult for Egan.

Besides his desire

to stay out of governmental service, he had come to en^oy
living in Washington and was reluctant to leave the country.
Furthermore, his wife did not relish the idea of such a great
change*

But Roosevelt*s offer came at a time when Egan was

dissatisfied with his work at Catholic University and had al
ready decided *to resign from the faculty.

Egan wanted more

timh to write, but the extensive preparations required for
hisy.classes made this impossible.

He had no assistants, de

spite his need for help, especially the aid of a philologist
trained in Old English.

E g a n ’s dissatisfaction had been fur-

ther augmented by the school's financial position.

Recent

financial reverses had forced the Catholic University trustees
to* pursue stern economic■measures, which were reflected in
%Bgan’s salary and overloaded.work schedule.

Roosevelt’s offer

of a diplomatic post in Copenhagen, in contrast, presented the
opportunity for a greater salary,- more congenial surroundings,
travel, added professional and social prestige, and greater
v<-— nn~r
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^ Recollections, pp.

197-198, 206, 217.

1

leisure time for writing — all the things in life which
46
Egan desired.
So, Egan decided to accept the Copenhagen
post where he- woiild spend the next ten years, ingratiate him
self with the Danish people, and become the “Prince Charming
hr?

of the Diplomatic Corps.”

Ibid., pp. 217-218.
hr*
*Henry Van Dyke, "Introduction,” Recollections, p. x.

CHAPTER II
EGAN:

THE DIPLOMAT

E g a n ’s appointment was welcomed by many prominent Ameri
cans.

In a letter to the New York Times, Richard Watson Gilr*»j i. Win u M ii iij'iiiiji n n i«ttii j t v i iw nw nnwa&’Miaawxcifta,

der, well-known literary figure, expressed the feelings of
many of them:

"President Roosevelt, in sending Dr. Maurice

T V Egan as our Minister to Denmark, not only selects for that
post a scholar and writer of genius and one highly competent
for his new position, but thereby gives pleasure to an unu
sually wide circle of acquaintances and friends of the new
Minister ... . ."

Gilder praised Egan as "a keen-minded stu

dent. and teacher of literature,, a delightful story writer,
and writer of exquisite verse," who had endeared himself "to
many personally for his wit, his geniality, and the loyalty
of his friendship.
.Although a non-career diplomat, Egan was well qualified
for the numerous duties of his ministerial post.

Somewhat

of a linguist, he was fluent in French, capable of simple
conversation in Italian, and had a- reading knowledge of Ger
man, although he knew no Danish.

He had gained much practi

cal experience in the intricacies of public relations while

% ew York Times, June 1, 1907. No mention of the Danish
reaction to EgaiTHiHapp ointment was made in the New York Times.
English translations of Danish sources are unavailable.
27

28
working as a newspaper editor and he could adapt to new -sur
roundings *

This ability to accept change so easily was- hu

morous 1 y described by Roosevelt1s secretary as “plasticity"
and'by the President as "that defect of your qualities • * •
/“which _7 'will help you very much as a diplomatist —

you

will soon be sufficiently Danish to make them understand you,
and still sufficiently American to keep that steel rod which
answers for a hack-bone in a perpendicular position*"

p

Be

sides possessing "great personal charm,10 Egan was known for
his witty conversation and was able at a. moment's notice to
tell a wonderful story on practically any topic *

Present-

dhy faculty members at the University of Notre Dame still re
member him*

He always "was expected to tell a good story and
A

• « * no one bothered whether he told the exact truth or not*"'
Bor several years, "President Roosevelt . «, • had admired his
■unfailing'tact * « •" and ability to handle people which
e;
seemed to make him a natural for the diplomatic fields*" The
one personal limitation Egan had was his pocketbook.

In the

Recollections, p. 219.
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**

■^Charles Callan Tans ill, The Purchase of the Danish West
Indies (Baltimore, 1936), p.
^Letter from Reverend Thomas T. McAvoy, C®S®C®, Univer
sity of Notre Dame Archivist, June 16 , 1965* Egan never lost
this ability and after retiring from public life would amuse
his grandchildren during his visits to their summer cottage
at Mountain Lake Park, Maryland, by making up stories in which
the children themselves were characters.
Interview with E g a n *s
daughter-in-law, Mrs* Gerald Egan, Washington, B.C., April
*I
tq a'c;*
^ Tan si 3.1, on. c i t ., p* 454.
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early 1900’s, the United States diplomatic corps was generally
composed -of wealthy men with independent Incomes.

Egan knew

he would encounter many problems because the position’s
$10,000 annual salary was inadequate.

6

He believed he would

be able to supplement the salary by royalties, especially
from the sale of his school books.

So convinced was he that

this ’additional income together with his salary would be suf
ficient,

that he refused financial aid offered to him by his

7
wealthier friends.1
The most important issue facing the new minister when he
arrived on August 27? 1907, was the United States’ desire to
^acquire the Danish Nest Indies.

Negotiations had first open-

r e d in 186?, but after the failure of the most recent attempt

in 1902, the prospect seemed unpromising.

Neither President

Roosevelt nor Senator Henry Oabot Lodge expected him to com.plete■the purchase, but they did seem to think that he "was
p

the best man to pave the wayIn
Before tackling that problem Egan first had to dispel
the popular Danish notion that Americans were blatant impe
rialists opposed to things cultural and devoted to the pur
suit of material ends -- a viewpoint created by the boorish
free-spending American tourists who frequented Denmark.^

^Out of this salary he was to rent, furnish, and staff
the Legation in Copenhagen in addition to financing the of
ficial entertainment.
^Recollections, pp. 220-221.
a i M9d . , p. 218.
«vr*rnc.« ic&r*aK

***

^Tanslli, op. eit,, p. 457•o a S * * *
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Egan was confident that he could rise above this stereo
type for several reasons.

He had a reputation as a man of

letters, which made him quite acceptable to the Danish press.
He had coine from Washington, which the Danes considered to be
a city of culture, and he was not rich, so the Danes could
not assume that he had purchased his post with campaign contributions.

11

Furthermore, Egan did not regard himself as a

political appointee like most of the non-career diplomats of
his day.

As he emphasized in his Recollections, Egan went to

Denmark because Roosevelt, insisted that he was needed and
well qualified for the job.

He did not regard his appoint-

^ ment. as a "pay-off” or display of cronyism, even though to

**■■■ all outward appearances the opposite seemed true.

Roosevelt*

. precise motivations for the appointment will never be known,
a

but his close friendship with Egan and, especially, Egan’s

y-Irish Catholic background were undoubtedly prime considera12
tions.
Roosevelt took great pride in the fact that his
appointees included men of almost all religions and back11
grounds. ^

E g a n ’s personal qualifications certainly figured

^ H i s t o r i a n lansill called him nan eminent scholar In
the field of English literature." o p . cit., p. 454.
11

Maurice Francis Egan, Ten Tears Near the German Fron 
tier (Hew York, 1919)s P« 66. .Hereafter this work will Tie~
cited as Ten Years.
\
ip
"^William Shannon had another opinion and believed Egan
was appointed to the post "in reward for his service as an un
official contact with the Catholic hierarchy on Church-State
problems in the Philippines and elsewhere." The American
Irish,' p. 3286
to
.
John Morton Blum, The Republican Roosevelt (Hew York,
19o2 ), p. 37.
’
"
’

.IMUiM r/aUAKllir-JK

in .Roosevelt1s decision, too.

As Tansill notes in his defin

itive study of the Danish West Indies purchase,

"if a diplo

mat was really needed at Copenhagen there was little doubt
Egan could rise to the occasion.
frequently made political appointments, was nevertheless
"linked by shirkers and incompetents and those unduly impress5
ed with pomp and social status.
Even though Egan "had always looked on the American dip
lomatic service as unworthy of serious consideration,n once
he,, arrived in Copenhagen he faced his new duties with great
enthusiasm.

16

As soon as he was settled in his post, he be-

ganyto' learn Danish and through intensive study and the help
of ;s
a,.:tutor .he quickly became fluent in the language.

He dem

onstrated his ability to the Danes by translating a Danish
lyric into English, an act which made him quite popular and
increased the prestige of the United States.

Egan then im

mersed himself in Danish life to avoid the common American
falling, of judging foreigners by American standards.

17

He

developed a strong admiration for the D a n e s ’ "elegant sim13
pllclty” and their devotion to the arts.
He applied all
his,, ingenuity to* publicizing the United States and promoting

1A

lansill, op. cit., p. 454.

i

-Howard K. Beale, Theodore Rooseveltand the Rise of
America to World Power (hew
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*^Recollections, p . 2 2 0 .
1e7
1 Ten Tears-, p.
67.t8Ibid., p. 198.
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a climate of understanding and respect between the two coun
tries,

His efforts to win the favor of the people met with

great success.

According to Dr. Henry Goddard Leach, noted

authority on Scandinavian civilisation,

"his / ^ ’
Ego.n9 s j

gra

ciousness and generousity became almost folklore in Denmark,
and the Danes loved his humor.M ^
Egan’s early ministerial work consisted primarily of
furnishing congressmen with reports on various sociological
and economic questions.
a system of protocol —

During this time he also developed
one which Egan said "saved us from

embarrassing mistakes;

» , . It was generally concluded that,
20
+for Americans, we were amazingly correct!"
Indeed, eti
q u e t t e and protocol were his fortes.
He had always been ,?&e*V:
..21
voted to all kinds of ceremonials. 1
He was a stickler for
^proper dress and even while teaching at Hotre Dame had been
masked, to deliver a series of lectures on manners and eti. ^ ■■n • ■mi i ■■ ■im|iiii« » ii ii i ina.
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^ H e n r y Goddard Leach, My L ast Seventy Tears (Hew York,
1956), p. 115. Dr. Leach (A.B. *~lE:Inceton, 1903; A.M., Har
vard, 1906; Ph«D., Harvard, 1908), has an extensive back
ground in Scandinavian studies.
He served as the curator of
Scandinavian history and literature at Harvard University
from 1921 to 1931 and, was professor of Scandinavian civili
zation at the University of Kansas for several years after
he assumed the post in 194-7* He was also secretary of the
American Scandinavian Foundation from 1912 to 1921 and pres
ident of that organization from 1926 to 194?.
He first be
came acquainted with Egan while studying in Denmark from 1910
to 1912 as a Harvard travelling fellow.
Dr. Leach has written
several books on various aspects of Scandinavian civilization
and is the recipient of five honorary degrees and numerous
decorations, many from the Scandinavian nations.
Who *s Who
ln_America, Vol. 35, 1968-1969 (Chicago, 1968), p.“T290.'
^Recollections, p. 236.
21 Ibid., p. 248.

quette.
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Whether at a .royal dinner, a formal reception, or .

at a simple diplomatic exchange 9 Egan always felt at ease. In
fact, the more formal and demanding the occasion, the more he
relished it.

President Roosevelt would have hesitated to

appoint him if he had not been equipped to handle the social
obligations so important in the life of a successful diplo
mat.
Egan had not been in Denmark long when he became con
cerned with Germany’s apparent efforts to make Denmark a German spiiere of influence.

23

Almost everywhere, Egan found

^.evidence of German attempts to dominate Danish life.

One of

|the tactics Egan observed was the German attempt to condition
r||fche..Danes to Identify all cultural achievement with Germany.
Egan believed that the Germans were overwhelming the Danes
,.|with liberal exports of the best German literature, art, sci^ence, and music.

The Danes were highly vulnerable to such

German.cultural influences.

Like the rest of Scandinavia,

Denmark was small and possessed a distinctive language.

Then,

as now, Danish authors had to publish In a major language if
they hoped to reach a wide audience.
—
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^ T h e lectures were later published under the title A
Gentleman (Eew XorJx, 1893).
Some of the chapter titles were:
TrLetter Writing11; ’’Rules of Etiquette"; and "What Does Hot
Make a Gentleman". .
23
Although E gan’s own book Ten Years R ear the German
Frontier is the only published monograph oiT~thT¥~aubject,
his findings have been confirmed, if only in sketchy terms,
by 0. Fritiof Ander in The Building of Modern Sweden (Rock
Island, Illinois, 1958), "ppT^Sy^B, and by T.K. Derry in A
Short m s t o r y . of Norway (London, 1957), p p . 2T3-2-1'5.~

vantage of this.situation and willingly provided the neces»»24
sary services to "friendly critics," "
Much to Egan's chagrin, the German efforts appeared to
be succeeding, despite the Danes* natural fear and distrust
of Germany as a result of the Schleswig-Holstein conquest,
Egan became convinced that to counteract this growth of Ger
man influence he had to launch a campaign of his own to pro
mote a favorable image of and create sympathy for the United
States; in his own words, his "first duty • • • C as_7 & dip25
lomatlst . . . Z~was_7 io make propaganda."
Egan became
an active supporter of exchange programs between Denmark and
the United States.

Preliminary work along this line had al

ready been done by Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia
University, who, like Egan, had hoped to offset some of the
Germans' propaganda efforts with the exchange of professors,
lecturers, and students.

Through Butler's endeavor Professor

Otto Jeepersen» a philologist from the University of Copen
hagen, visited the United States.
field of

Harvard, and Dr. Gore

In return Butler, Dr. Scho

of George Washington University,

all eminent scholars, lectured In Denmark.

26

»

Egan s back

ground as a scholar and writer gave him a natural apprecia
tion f o r -such programs of cultural exchange and also assured
him a respectful hearing in Danish intellectual circles.
■Trr» n~a~rn
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^ T e r Years, pp. 141-148.
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also participated in tills cultural pro gram by undertaking
07

lecture tours in the '.Danish provinces "

and by contributing

-• several poems on Banish themes to some of the leading United
States magazines, including the Century Magazine and Scrib-

28

,

ner s .

The Banes took particular note of Egan when in 1908 he
was elected a member of the National Institute of Arts and
letters.

In 1911 he gained even more prestige when he took

time off from his diplomatic duties to deliver a series of
29
lectures at Johns Hopkins.
He gave similar talks at Ear. 30
?£ard in 191 A.
In 1911 he was also chosen to be the repre«

tentative of Georgetown University at the centenary of the
Royal Frederick University in Christiania, Norway, where he
was picked as the dean of the representatives from the west31
fern hemisphere.
*£'•

Egan was pleased by all these honors.

But perhaps his

^ E g a n found that he learned more about "the attitude
of the Banish mind” during these tours than he did during
the hundreds of formal dinners he gave and attended.
Ten
Years, p. 150.
aQ
See, for instance, Egan, "Swimmer at Elsinore,”
Scribner’s, LYI (September, 1914), P « 406, and "Banish Cas%Te7*r”3entnry Magazine, LXXIX (November, 1909), p. 116,

< W « i 11ip nfe.-a«a.«a»

^ S e e New York Times, May 13, 1911*
-^See New.York Times, April 9* 1914, and Recollections,
p. 288.
— — — —
_ _ _ _
This honor, while impressive to the Banes, is not very
important when compared with E g a n ’s other accomplishments..
In selecting its representative-, 'Georgetown would have wanted
•to have curbed expenses as well as selected a worthy man.
Egan was a renowned scholar, a Georgetown graduate, and a
resident of Scandinavia.
He was the obvious choice.

.

greatest pleasure at this time came when a Banish publishing
house asked him to draw up a.list of American books suitable
for translation and publication in Denmark.

American liter

ature was virtually unknown in pre-World War I Denmark, but
Egan's efforts to counteract German propaganda and to publi
cize the United States had paid off.

Because of his efforts

the Banes finally began to realize that America possessed
more than a rude frontier culture, and Egan was satisfied
that the United States finally commanded the respect in Ban
ish intellectual circles that he believed it should.
In economic areas Egan confronted more difficult prob
lems .

He believed that United States tariff laws were fly

ing in the face of all his efforts to improve Banish-American
relations.

.Two particular instances of high tariffs caused

Egan a great deal of embarrassment.

At Arnager, an island

near the city of Copenhagen, the descendants of the early
Butch settlers grew the finest cabbage and cauliflower in
Europe.

Since the farmers were anxious to market their cab

bage in the United States, it was important both to them and
to the Sc and in&vi an-Am eric an Line, the shippers, that the
cabbage enter the United States with as little duty as pos
sible.

Unfortunatelyj. Egan complained,

"Our legislators did

not think so; the tariff on the inoffensive cabbages was put
so high that export ceased.”

The second economic source

of embarrassment for Egan was that of Royal Danish Porcelain.

-^Recollections, p. 262.

Although one of the typical products of Copenhagen it had
never been commercialized.

No matter what the temptation,

factory managers did not lower the quality of their artistic
product.

Egan knew that the porcelain did not really compete

with any similar product in the United States, but the import
taxes placed upon it were almost prohibitive.

To Egan it

seemed "useless to talk of friendly feeling toward a small
-country when its. limited products were barred . . . .”33
Egan attempted to use his Influence to have the tariff on the
Amager produce and the tariff on Danish porcelain reduced so
ffcjmb Denmark could sell these goods on the American market.
Jn^ re turn Egan tried to get the Danes to accept a patent coni^fntion with the United States.

He failed in both instances.

s.h
'

In January 1911? Andrew Carnegie, the steel magnate, made
ian offer .to the Danish Government, through Egan, to establish
a "Hero Fund” similar to ones already established in the
United States, Canada, Newfoundland, Britain, France, and
Germany.

The fund .was designed to support the wives and fam-

ilies of men killed while performing some act of heroism In
peacetime or to support, the here himself during his disability,
should he have been injured.

In his letter to the King of

Denmark, Carnegie outlined the principles of the Fund, gave
some examples, and suggested that Egan be made vice-president
of the Fund in D e n m a r k . ^

53ibid.

Egan doubtlessly appreciated the

34I'bid,

J^Axidrew Carnegie to the King of Denmark, March 24, 1911.
Copy of original letter on loan to author from Mrs. John Cra
mer, E g a n ’s granddaughter.

opportunity to be of service to this worthy cause, but it
made great demands on his valuable time.

He was besieged

with requests for aid and a considerable amount of his activ
ity was spent in "Hero Fund" administrative work.

However

upsetting Carnegie’s gift was to E g a n ’s routine, it did pro
vide another avenue for upgrading Danish-American relations.
Even better opportunities for Increasing American pres
tige in Denmark during E gan’s early years at his post were
presented by the visits to Copenhagen of several notable
Americans:

Dr. Frederick A. Oook, the Arctic explorer; for

mer President Roosevelt; Booker T. Washington, the Negro ed
ucator and founder of Tuskegee Institute; and the officers
and men of a division of the U.S. N a v y ’s Atlantic Fleet.
Dr. Cook’s arrival in Copenhagen on September 4, 1909?
;began a well-publicized, but embarrasEdng week for Egan.

"I

stm afraid X received the news of his /™0ook’s„7 coming rather
indifferently," he later wrote.

"A consul from Greenland

came in one afternoon and informed me that the greatest event
of the century had occurred.
An American had discovered the
36
North Pole I"
Egan was wary lest he embarrass the United
States Government by a too-hasty acclamation of Cook, but the
Danes were, unhesitating.

The captain of the King’s yacht

typified the Danish reaction when lie said, "America, the

3^R g collections, p. 268. Egan added that perhaps his
lack of excitement over the discovery was a result of a
schoolboy task when he had been "obliged to parse .Doctor
K a n e ’s Arctic Voyages . . . . I had an unconquerable preju
dice against everything in the.Ar.c-tic Circle."

37

greatest.country in the world, is covered with laurels I n

The Danes h a d .heen only too willing to turn aside .from
the hitter political battle being fought in the Rigsdag over
the question of defensive armament against the threat of Ger
man aggression.

'When Cook arrived he directed attention away

from, politics at a time of tremendous public crisis, and so
the people were eager to take him to their hearts.

Prepar-

ing to welcome the explorer upon his arrival were the Danish
Government, the Royal Geographic Society, the Copenhagen City
Councils and the Chamber of Commerce.

Despite his misgivings,
33
h g a % h a d little choice but to join the welcoming committee.
...v-GBgan found Cook to be very simple and straightforward.
i-•He was bronzed, dressed in ancient clothes, redeem
ed by* .a pair of reversible white cuffs and I could
not help noticing that his teeth were rather ground
down.
1 asked one of the devoted admirers the rea;tson for this.
*He was obliged to chew walrus hide
>
. in the Arctic Circle. ‘ Being hopelessly unscien
tific, . . . I looked on this proof of having^reach\v. e& the North Pole with awe-struck admiration.39
Although still not completely willing to accept Cookfs elate
on behalf of the United States Government, Bgan did try to
render him every possible service and still take full advan
tage of the propaganda possibilities presented to the United
States.

On September 10 Cook left Copenhagen in triumph,

having won the hearts of the people and having received two
•i~ — ~
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Danish unreserved enthusiasm was also
described by John*Hohenberg in fforeign Corresponden c e : The
Great Reporters and Their T i m e w
7
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""Ten Years, p. 47, and Recollections, pp. 268-269.
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of-the .'Banes1 highest awards.

Even before he left, however,

the famous Coole-Peary controversy had started.4^

While Cook

was basking in Banish acclaim, Peary had arrived in Labrador,
having come from the North Pole which he had reached.on April
6, 1909 9 and charged Gook with being a fraud.

The message

Egan received at the Legation, relayed from Peary, stated "I
have planted the American flag on the North Po3»e and Cook has
41
given you a gold brick/*
A furor arose with Egan and the
American Legation in the center.
via stuck hard to Cook,

"Denmark and all Scandina

Great Britain sneered.

King Edward

X r o m the beginning had been one of Cook’s opponents.

Queen

.Alexandra / “Edward*s Danish wife_7 continued to believe in
Oook, though she expressed herself as being really happy that
the rivalry between the -two explorers could not generate in2}W'
ternational hatred — they were both Americans." ^ Egan,
fortunately, was in the clear.

Throughout C o o k ’s stay he had

treated him only as a notable American and never judged the
validity of his claim.
Cook’s departure.

The row in Denmark subsided after

Egan was happy to forget the entire affair.

^'°Hohenberg, on. eit., up,
s“"*^

MrMT&M

name.-rKXB.ncm.

193-199-

Recollections , pp. 270-271.
42

Ibid., pp. 268-= 272, and Ten Tears, p. 47.

4 -%hen Cook brazenly returned to Copenhagen in 1915 to
lecture, Egan fortunately remained aloof, for a riot nearly
broke out in the lecture hall despite the fact that Cook’s
friends were, in the majority.
Egan's comment.was: "It was
a disagreeable experience for an American Minister; but as
long as the Government of the United States was not committed
to Dr. Cook's claims, and an American had made the discovery,
matters were not as bad as they might have been.” Recollec-

The visit of former President TheodoreiRoosevelt; to Den
mark from May 2 to May 4, -191.0, vas in pleasant contrast.
Roosevelt stopped in Denmark on his way to Norway to make his
Nobel Prise acceptance speech.

According to Egan* the Danes

looked on Roosevelt's visit as a great compliment.

Before

receiving news of the former Presid e n t s intentions. King
Frederick VII had made plans because of ill-health to go to
the Riviera.

Nonetheless, the King told Egan that he would

make, all the arrangements for Roosevelt*s stay and extend him
every courtesy that the country had to offer.
much for him as if he were an Emperor."

MI will do as

The King arranged

that Roosevelt and.his family be given the Ohristiansborg
PaXaee during their stay, apartments formerly reserved f o r
such royal visitors as the King of England and the Czar of
44
Russia.
• Egan remarked later that "Mr. and Mrs. Roosevelt came;
he saw; he conquered; but Mrs. Roosevelt won all hearts."
The Danes were particularly impressed with the manner in
which, the former first lady handled herself in an awkward
situation involving her first Danish social function.

The

Rooseve3„tsf baggage failed to arrive in time for the event,
a *court dinner given JLn their honor by the Oroim Prince, and
they were forced to dine in their traveling clothes.

Mrs.

Rooseve3.t accepted the inconvenience so graciously that,
according to Egan, she ably dispelled the popular Danish no

tion "that American ladies have the plebian habit of 'fussi
n e s s 1."

The Roosevelts continued to impress the Danes dur

ing the remainder of their three-day visit*

The Crown Prince
45
lauded the former President as "a Man" for years afterward.
Booker T. Washington came to Denmark on a lecture tour
in the fall of 1910.

Egan greatly admired him and knew that

he would receive a warm welcome from the Danish royal family.
But he was unsure of the.-way Washington's visit would be re
ceived by southern Americans.

Egan was on guard against any

offensive remarks which might be made by southern papers and
and picked up by the Danish press.

To avoid such complica

tions, -Egan suggested to King Frederick and Queen Louise that
Washington:be received informally and in private ”so that he
would be more at . . . ease."

46

Although concerned for the

interests-- of his visitor, Egan was equally interested in pre
serving newly created U.S.-Danish rapport.

Any outburst of

racial hatred such as that following Washington’s visit with
President Roosevelt at the White House would have destroyed
most of. the cordial relations Egan had built up.

Egan attend

ed Washington's lecture along with "all the Americans . . .
Z~he_7 could collect."

Even though the Negro educator’s

visit was. brief and hurried, Egan was convinced that it helped
greatly to dispel the Danish impression "that lynching . . .
/Pwas _7 "to the Americans of North America what bullfights are

hr?

to those of South America,51 '
The next spring,

1911> Egan hosted the Second Battle

Division of the United States Navy's Atlantic Fleet when it
stopped at Copenhagen on a good will four.

Both officers and

enlisted personnel favorably impressed the Banes, who were
pleased and flattered by the visit.
tertain the men.

Egan did his best to en

His son Gerald even arranged a baseball

game between two of the ships 1 crews, which the Banes enjoyed
as much as did the participants.

_Though. Egan considered the

visit good for Danish-American relations, it placed a great
financial burden on him.

The heavy entertainment expenses

he ihncurred still caused him problems four-years later.
:: By 1912 Egan had established his reputation as a success
ful diplomat.

This was acknowledged when President Taft al-

lowed hip to remain at his post.

A8

The greatest compliment

to 4iis abilities came in 1 9 1 3 * however, when Uoodrow Uilson
was elected President.

The Democrats, who were taking con

trol for the first time in sixteen years, were determined to
enjoy the spoils of victory.

Consequently, the diplomatic

service experienced extensive personnel changes, and Egan's
position in Copenhagen seemed tenuous.

True, he had always

protested that he was not a political appointee, but he had
been appointed and retained by Republican administrations
and enjoyed the support of his friends Theodore Roosevelt and
*----- -—
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^ Ibid., up, 249-250 .■

^ Taft had 'written to Egan "You shall remain in your
post as long as I remain in mine."
Ten Years, p. 111.

Richard Watson Gilder.

It was thus somewhat of a surprise

to everyone when Wilson asked Egan to remain on in Denmark.
The New York Times, commenting about Wilson's actions in its
July 9 9

1 9 1 3 * edition, pointed out what a "notable exception"

Egan's retention was:
The. efforts made in recent years to build up
an American diplomatic service in which merit and
special training instead of political influence
should be considered as the determining factor in
bestowing preference will not be counted by the
Wilson Administration . . . . Indications are that
the Administration intends to make what will amount
to almost a clean sweep of the higher grades of the
diplomatic service.
One notable exception is Dr.
Maurice Francis Egan, the Minister to Denmark, a
Republican, appointed by President Roosevelt, to
whom the post of Ambassador to Austria was offered
by President Wilson and declined.
It is not likely,
however, that any other appointees of a Republican
Administration will be treated with such considera
tion.^

•

^The, specific reasons motivating Wilson to retain Egan in the
.•Copenhagen post are unclear, but Egan was probably saved by
,his apolitical background and record as s. diplomat.

A3.though

the Hew York Times described Egan as a Republican, he had
finHhriMiTftffc ifcn mi

w n*r.iWiii»i»»nnr<i»ni

^

never clearly identified with any party.

‘*L

He had close friend

in both major parties but he never openly discussed politics.
This was his habit both before and after his arrival in Den
mark.

The last public political support he gave was in 1888,

when his editorials In the Freeman's Journal supported Cleve
land.

More important than Egan's politics was the ground

work he had already laid in Copenhagen.

‘-H e w York Times, July 9> 1913* p

Wilson was keenly

interested in the Danish West Indies

c,0

,
and appreciated Egan s

attempts to reopen negotiations for their sale to the United
States.

Wilson again indicated his respect for Egan's abil

ities when he offered Egan the post in Vienna.
was apparently made for two reasons:

The decision

it was customary for

the United States Government to send a Catholic as ambassador
tc 11the foremost Catholic Court of Europe” ; and Egan had high
standing as a scholar.

Unfortunately, Egan could not afford

the expenses of maintaining the Vienna post and was forced to
52
decline.
As it turned out, his refusal allowed him to dem
onstrate his prowess as a diplomat by handling the negotia
tions leading to the United States’ purchase of the Danish
W e s t Indies and problems arising out of World War I.
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^ S e e Chapter III, p. 61 .
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CHAPTER III
THE PURCHASE OP TEE PARISH WEST IUDIES;
"A FIXED IDEA'' FULFILLED
The greatest accomplishment of Maurice Francis E g a n 1s
career as a diplomat was his handling of United States nego
tiations for the purchase, of the Danish West Indies *

He held

tenaciously to a ’’fixed idea” that the Islands should be the
■property of the United States and quietly persisted for al
m o s t eleven years to secure the territory for his government.^
<■

When he appointed Egan as Minister to Denmark, President

^Roosevelt, was convinced that these islands —

'St. Thomas, St*

f.ohn, St.. Oroix, and a scattering of small offshore cays —
sjrere- important militarily for defense of the proposed Isth
mian canal.

He expressed his feeling in a letter to Secre

tary of State John Hay in 1903s

’’Both the Dutch and the Dan

ish West Indies in America . . . will be a constant temptation to Germany unless or until we take them.” '

Senator Henry

Cabot Ledge’s argument was similar to Roosevelt’s.
as the islands are in the market, " Lodge wrote,

”So long

’’there is

*Arthur S. Link, Wilson:
Campaigns for Progressivism
and Peace, 191o— j 91T (Princeton, Hew Jersey, 195 5), p. 61.
O
'"Theodore Roosevelt to John Hay, Washington, April 22,
1903> quoted in Tyler Dennett, John Hay, from Poetry to Poll
tics (Mew York, 1933), pp. 387-3387
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4?
danger that some European power will purchase t h e m w h i c h
would be an infraction of the Monroe Doctrine; and, their
military value, as Captain Mahan had pointed out, could hardly be overestimated *n

3

Since Egan had been a frequent visitor at the White
House and a popular guest at -Washington diplomatic gather
ings', he was thoroughly familiar with the views held on this
subject by the President and leading members of Congress.
He became convinced of the validity of the President's fears
regarding the Danish islands within a short time after he ar
rived in Copenhagen.
memoirs,

u! became aware,fl he recalled in his

11that Prussianized Germany might, at any moment seize

that little country, and . \ . the Danish West Indies would
h
be German . . . .
The pessimism of the Danes, who seemed
„

t©-consider subjugation by Germany just a matter of time,

6

strengthened Egan *s determination to obtain the islands for
the United States.

Conditions in .1907, however, were far

from ideal for opening such negotiations.

Two previous trea-.

.ties had been killed, one by the United States Senate and the
other by the Danish Landsting, the upper house of the Danish
Rigsdag,

Ho Danish politician,was*anxious to risk another

attempt to sell -the islands, even though the blame for both

5 Quoted by Dennett, Hay, p. 26?.
^len Years, pp. 54-555 and Recollections, p. 277.
By
the time of the outbreak of the War, Egan. beTieved Germany
had lost interest in the -islands, but the United States Gov*
eminent;s attitude remained unchanged,
"'Ten Tears, p. 94.
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failures could easily be placed on the United States.
She Treaty of 186? had promised St. Thomas and St. John
in. return for $7.*800,000.

Although, it had embodied all of

the demands of the United States Government, it was killed in
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

^largely through the

hostility of Senator Charles Sumner who feared President
.£ Andrexf_7 Johnson would reap credit from the purchase.

The more recent treaty in 1902 was disapproved by a single
vote in the Danish Landsting.

Several influential. Danes had

opposed the sale because it would have reduced the size and
prestige of Denmark.

The United States, too, was partially

to blame for the treaty’s failure because of the small pay7
impart it had offered — only $5,000,000,

^
nRebert Lansing, ’’The Drama of the Virgin Islands Purdjhase, ” Dew York Times Magazine (July 19, 1931), p. 4. Also
Minister Egan to Secretary of State, Do. 444, July 21, 1911,
papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States.
Hereafter this compilation will be cited asHForcign Relations
Papers .
7

Beale,
Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America tc
World Power,
p. 4-1 o; Recollections, p. 2oo; and Ten
Tears,
"p. 224.
This is also the opinion of Dennett, oj>, cit. , p.
273, who wrote:
’’Quite possibly, if he / ~ H a y J f h a d been at
liberty to proceed with less haste, and if he had been a man
to whom a few millions of dollars had seemed of less conse
quence, Hay might have succeeded.”
In Washington-at the time, however, it was believed that
Germany had been responsible for the failure of the United
States to get the islands.
John Hay and Henry White were the
strongest exponents of this view.
Although Germany at that time was anxious to secure na
val stations
ip the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico and
wasin
terested in the Danish islands for herself, she did
not bring
any pressure to bear either for or against the sale.
The re
cently published Memoirs of Friedrich von Holstein, who planned
and directed German foreign policy from 1890 until 1906, bear
this out.
They also disprove a theory of E gan’s that Germany
had no regard for the United States’ Monroe Doctrine.
Homan

These-failures'Here not' Egan's, only obstacles

.a. fact

he discovered to his dismay during his first reception with
the Danish Queen*

Queen Louise, who was deeply concerned

about.the plight of the Negroes in the United States, had
read Uncle Tom's Cabin and on the basis of it she apparently
assumed lynching of Negroes was ”the American equivalent of
the Spanish bullfight.”

She feared a similar fate would be-

Rich and M.H. Fisher, ed„, The Holstein Pacers, Vol. I, Mem
oirs and Political Observations ^Cambridge, 1955) 9 PP*- 1
»77~
tf37~
"The Navy, understandably enough, had constantly in view7
the acquisition of naval bases and was convinced that the pelicy of the German Empire should be adapted and subordinated
to this special interest . . . . 1It should be the task of
^.properly directed foreign policy,/ said . . . Admiral /"von
:&enden_7 ?to acquire an island in the Gulf of Mexico without
straining our relations with America
an impossible task at
variance with the Monroe Doctrine and the ever-growing aware•ness in the United States that they are the leading Power in
■fthe- whole of the American continent.
Holieben C Ambassador,
J.;n Washington, 1897-1903„/> whose expert opinion was sought
-.on this fquestion, declared that the possible consequences of
f e m a n y ' s gaining a footing near the American coast could not
•be foreseen.
Here again it was the Foreign Ministry which
opposed the intention of accepting Denmark's offer . . . of
St. Thomas Island* which, though only thirty-two square miles
in extent, Is of strategic and commercial importance.”
An editor's footnote included this excerpt from the For
eign Ministry files.
"In January 1900 Tirpitz asked the For
eign Ministry what attitude to take towards a petition from
the Pan-German League advocating the purchase by Germany of
the Danish Virgin Islands.
In view of the fact that the
United States was already negotiating with Denmark about the
purchase of these Islands, the Pan-German League feared dif
ficulties and so It recommended that the United States should
be prevented for the time being from purchasing the islands.
Then Germany ought to purchase from Denmark the exclusive
right to establish harbour Installations, coal depots, and
cable stations, on the islands, so as to gain a footing there.
On 16 June the Ambassador in Washington was asked for his
opinion.
On 30 June he reported that any step which the
United States regarded as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine
would have incalculable results.
The petition from the PanGerman League was not followed up.”

fall the West Indian Hegroes should they ever come under
American -control.

Egan realised the Queen would not support

any United States attempt to purchase) the Danish West Indies
no matter how attractive the offer.

He learned later that

many other Danes shared their Queen1s concern for the welfare
of Hegroes under American rule.

Their feelings were height

ened by the occasional but lurid, accounts of lynchings publis.hed in .American newspapers and quoted by the Danish press.

8

Such problems convinced Egan that there was no possibil
ity of opening negotiations for several years, but he per
sisted in keeping the thought alive by discussing it infor™
ma|Llye

.Throughout his memoirs he repeated that to him buying

o
3 islands was ”a fixed idea” and he liked to. talk about it,*'
He,, kept a .close watch on all factors
diplomatic, and social —

economic, political,

which would affect a future sale

and, simultaneously, he tried to sustain State Department in
terest in the matter.

In a steady flow of reports he die-

cussed the Danish Government and its problems, pertinent
views of influential Danish political and economic groups,
and conditions in the islands themselves.
Throughout the Taft administration Danish public opinion
continued to be anti-sale.

The aristocracy and large land

holders, who as hereditary landlords opposed parting with
any territory, feared a breakup of Denmark’s possessions
abroad would signal the lower classes to force a breakup and

p

^Ten Tears, p. 24-7? and Recollections, p. 230.
9fen Tears, p. 224,

distribution of their-vast landed estates at home.

Since

they exercised considerable power.in the Landsting* their
active opposition was a.serious problem.

The small farmers

and the commercial classes tended to favor the sale but their
views did not carry the same weight in the Rigsdag.

Most

Lanes were indifferent to the whole idea of selling the is.lands, being more concerned about "low taxes and good prices
10
for butter, milk, and the cattle they exported,"
This in
difference, which aided opponents of the sale, had an opposite effect on the islands themselves.
neglected.

They were completely

The Danish Government viewed the islanders as

>a^tiable. black children who were to be indulged in their idio-*
syneraQies, and in no way managed or coerced."

Several at

tempts .had been made to change these conditions.

At one point

a^lottery was organized to obtain financial support for the
territory,; but the proceeds were totally insufficient.

The

majority of all similar plans were equally unsuccessful.
Danish businessmen could see the potential that the ter
ritory had as a commercial maritime ba.se.

Aware of the value

of the splendid harbor-of St. Thomas alone, some promoters
appealed to the Danish Government for funds to begin a level12
opment proJeet,.but no action was taken on their request.
Even the .influence wielded by such businessmen as the Admiral

^ Eoreign Relations Papers, Egan to P.G.- Knox, Secretary
of State, no R o ., Copenhagen, August 9? 1909.
1U
_

de Richelieu, a director of the vast Seandihavian-American
Line and a close friend of Egan's, had little effect.

The

Danish Government steadfastly paid little heed to suggestions
that the lands could and should he managed as a business,
E ga n ’s reports were filled with similar illustrations of Den
mark's neglect of her Caribbean colonial possessions.
Many-of Egan's 1909 dispatches concerned the Danish Gov
ernment's finances.

Although improved over the previous year

Denmark’s economy was unsteady.

Many businessmen were liv13
ing on credit extended chiefly by Germany.
Additionalxy,

Denmark had problems with Iceland and her monopoly in GreenLand.

The Danish Foreign Minister called his government’s

finances "deplorable" but he told Egan that Denmark would not
'consider selling the Danish best' Indies to the United States.
N e i t h e r /"politicalj? party,” he confided to Egan,

"would

like to see the money from the Islands put into the hands of
the opposing influence."

14

Despite such political obstacles,

Egan continually encouraged the Department of State to be
cordial to Denmark.

United States influence was increasing,

especially because Denmark approved the treatment accorded
Cuba and the Philippines.

Even the suspicious Danish land-

owners favorably viewed the United States’ action in those
territories.
By 1910 Egan's reports were more encouraging.
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'^Foreign Relations Papers, Egan to Secretary of State,
no Ho., Copenhagen, April~T7, f909.

fleeted a gradual transformation of Danish views toward Amer
ica.

.The King and .the traditional conservatives still did

not favor selling, the islands* hut an important government
.official told Egan that the King would not actively oppose a
a majority in the Rigsdag, nor would the conservatives try
to .block the sale, if Denmark gained enough commercial advan.tages from such a treaty.
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.As Egan observed this mellowing of opposition, he sought
to press his cause from another angle,

He was fully aware of

Danis-h feeling that the country had already lost too much ter
ritory,

He thought a bargain could be worked cut if some quid

pro,/quo, W8;s found to appease the pride of the patriotic Danes.
Believing that he had found such a solution, Egan in Septem
ber. 1$1G wrote to Huntington Wilson, Assistant Secretary of
State/ : He promised to send ,fa. very important and very auda
cious suggestion” which ”would mean, if carried into effect,
the acquisition on our part of both Greenland and the Danish
West Indies.”

Egan explained that the report he would send

on.September 23 was. a synthesis of suggestions made to him by
16
influential. Danes and not to be taken lightly.
In brief,
his proposal called f o r :
(1)
»

Denmark to give Greenland to the United States.
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^ F oreign Relations Papers, Egan to Secretary of Stats,
Ho. 3o7s*Copenhagen, December 6*, 1910.
Secretary Knox an
swered this report and asked that the Department be kept fully
informed.
Secretary of State Knox to Egan, Ho. 111, Washing
ton, January 25* 1911.
1G
Foreign Relations Papers, Egan to Assistant Secretary
of State, no” Hoi, Copenhagen,”’September 20, 1910.

(2)

(3)
(4)

The United States in return to give Denmark
the southern group of the Philippines, con
sisting of the Islands of Mindinao, Palauan,
and the small islands south of these.
Denmark to then surrender these islands to
Germany.
Germany in return to give back to Denmark
the northern part of Schleswig,,

With such a trade Egan believed that the Danes would be so
delighted with the return of their beloved province of Schles
wig that they would be willing to sell the Danish West Indies
17
to their benefactor, the United States.
The diplomatic significance that such a transaction
would-have had for the United States and Germany was more im
portant than the bartering of the real estate involved.

Egan*

thinking was based upon his own interpretation of the Par East
18
situation.,- This analysis, completely his own work, ' was
folanded on his conviction that "there remains only one great
European, power whose interest in East Asia runs parallel with
thGpq / sicj? of America, and that is Germany.”

Germany and

the United States, both industrial nations with rapidly ex
panding populations, .desired to preserve the "open door1’ in
China.

After 19075 Russia altered her foreign policy.

Her

^ F o r e i g n Relations Pacers, Egan to Assistant Secretary
of State, no No., Copenhagen, September 23? 1910,
On loan to
the author from Mrs. John Cramer was a draft of this letter
dated September 19, 1910.
A copy of this, plan was resubmitted by Egan to the De
partment of State in 1915.
Foreign Relations Papers, The
Lansing .Papers, 1914-1920, 2 .VoTST CNashlnston, f^39-^?P£5"),
IT, Egan to Secretary of State, No, of3s Copenhagen, March o,
1915.
See also Charies Callan Tansill. The Purchase of the
Danish West Indies (Baltimore, 1932), p / 41>0.
~
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18p q reign Relations Papers, Egan to Assistant Secretary
of State, no No*, Copenhagen, September 20, 1910.
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aim then seemed !rto be in conjunction with Japan, and . .
later with China, to try to monopolize the political, finan
cial, and'mercantile affairs of the Far East.”

Egan believed

that France would soon find its position in the Far East an
impossible one since she lacked both the surplus population
and the qualities necessary for .a permanent colonial empire.
Thus, he predicted, "the ancient . . • kingdoms in the East,
which France . * . despoiled and oppressed through greater
force and superior armament, will one day rise against her
. . . and they will be backed by a continent.”
England ^was also in a difficult position.
Jap

Egan believed

By her support of

In..the Russo-Japanese War- she had "helped to raise the

yellow race from its long lethargy and made it aware of its
own power,; and she now stands perplexed and amazed at the resultsyohe . « . helped to achieve.

The yellow spectre is out

of the box, and . . . it now threatens to turn against its
liberators and supporters.”

What then about the role of the

United States in this area of the world?

Despite the expense,

Egan believed the United States necessarily had to maintain
the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippines In order to retain
her power status, in the Pacific and protect her vital commer
cial interests in eastern Asia.

America needed Germany®s

friendship and support, but Egan felt this could be gained by
ceding to her the southern islands.of the Philippine group.
Such a transfer would make Germany a United States partner
and enable the two countries to work together to preserve the
"open door” and to guard against the rising "Yellow Peril.”

With a permanent possession in the East, Germany could then
afford to return Kiao Chou to China, a gesture, Egan reasoned,
that would help win the friendship of the Chinese and guard
against the day when a more powerful China might decide not to
renew Germany*s annual lease, thus leaving the United States
without an ally in the Par East.

19

In view of the boldness of his proposal, Egan, whether
to preserve his “diplomatic neck” or to be diplomatically po
lite, included the following statement in his dispatch:
You may ask whether I consider this proposition
feasible or not.
I can only answer that I have
been so much engaged in discovering what is really
in men's minds over here that I have become, per
haps, a little too concentrated to take that broad
view which is a habit with you, who are constantly
facing many great questions, and therefore, it
would be unreasonable for me to make an answer
go
ithat would imply a larger experience than I have.

.

ih5
Egan’s audacious plan, which embodied a completely new
m
J^Ear East foreign policy for the United States, not to mention
d the effect it would have on United States diplomatic relations
with Europe, must have left Secretary of State Knox speechless.
There is no answer to it in the published Foreign Relations
Papers.
Egan's memoirs do not indicate whether he felt thwarted
In his first attempts at creative diplomacy, but his next re
port to the State Department, in December 1910, made no men21
tion of the contents of the September messages.
If his
•acC fev . to?
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!9Ifcid.
2 0 Ibid.

21 See Note 15.

pride had been injured, he successfully liid his wounds.
Progress toward opening sale negotiations stagnated for
the following seven months.

Then on July 21, 1911? Egan re

ported that the Banish Minister of Foreign Affairs had told
him that the Banish Government would make no proposition to
the United States concerning the Banish West Indies "unless
public sentiment is expressed very strongly."

Egan immediate

ly iset out to rouse just such sentiment, chiefly with the help
of the radical Banish press, with which he had always enjoyed
much rapport.

2?
"

It is an interesting coincidence that short

ly^ thereafter several Banish newspapers took up the cause of
the-' -sale of the Banish West Indies.

An article in K^benhavn,

as.conservative anti-sale paper, highlighted the controversy
that followed:
In certain radical and social-democratic circles,
there has of late been carried on an agitation
r w i t h the view of again bringing the question of
&.<'• the sale of the West Indian Islands into the orvder of the day, and that attempts are being made
in these circles to create a feeling favorable to
the sale of the islands and partly by belittling
the value of the work which has already been done
far improvement of the Islands and the future
possibilities for the islands which will be opened
up by the completion of the Panama Canal . . , *
But we can fortunately add that the agitation,, no
matter how cunningly It has' been arranged, has not
gained and will not gain a foothold outside of
radical and social-democratic circles.23

^ Foreign Relations Pacers, Egan to Secretary of State,
No. 444, Copenhagen, July 2TTH1911.
-'Foreign Relations Papers, Egan to Secretary of State,
No. 4?8, Copenhagen, November 15% 1911.
The article from
K^benhavn was from the November It, 1911, Issue and was accom
panied by a translation.
Egan also enclosed a clipping from
the August 6 , 1911, edition of Copenhagen1s Social-Bemokraten,
m
a .Liberal. Banish paper.
~
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At this time the potential impact that the completed
Panama Canal would.- have on the prosperity of the Danish Nest
Indies became a chief topic in every discussion about the is
lands.

Egan *s report of November 15* 1911* contained refer

ences to a conversation he had had with the Minister of For
eign Affairs which touched on this impact*

All.though vague on

details, the Minister said that he had once been in favor of
selling the territory to the United States because it was un
profitable and would be difficult to defend in wartime.
lately his views had changed.
should improve in the islands.
better.

But

Now, he believed conditions
The industrial outlook was

because of the canal_7 an& the Danish .Government was

doing its best to deepen the Danish harbor on St. Thomas.

The

rest of their conversation according to Egan was verbal sparr i n g r,that was interesting because in it Egan contradicted the
plan h.e had proposed just a year earlier.
I said I understood that Danish national pride was
the main thing that stood in the way of parting
with these islandsj and naturally we Americans, who
were sometimes sentimental ourselves, sympathized
with this . . . .
C ButJ7 I said I was surprised
that there still existed Danes who imagined that
the West India Islands could be traded to Germany
for Shieswig
sic_7*
Schleswig, as I had good
reason to know, prefers to remain German, even if
such a project were not absolutely impossible.24
Since it would have been useless to pursue the purchase
Issue further while the Danes were waiting to see how the Pan
ama Oanal would affect the islands, Egan wisely decided to be

^ Foreign Relations Papers, Egan to Secretary of State,
No. 476, Copenhagen, November 14, 1911.
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as -cooperative as possible and bided his time.

Aside from a

communication to the State Department on the subject in May
1 9 1 3 s he did not mention the matter again for almost two years.
Finally5 in March 1915s he concluded that the time was right
at last to approach the Danish Government about selling the
islands,

bar had come to Europe, and Denmark, although neu

tral, was badly-in need of money.

The government had greatly

overextended itself financially because of its numerous social
welfare programs:

its pledge to better the lot of the poor;

its advancement of funds to small farmers; its support of a
> farmers cooperative banking system; its old age pensions and
employment insurance; and numerous other social programs.
•

also supported an army the size of the regular army in the
United States before the War.

Consequently, Denmark could ill-

pnoijfford to use national income to pay any of the islands 1 oper*
25
;: voting expenses.
4’ J' t:

In view of Denmark1s economic situation, Egan wrote to
the Secretary of State on March 8 , 1915:
It may seem out of place for me, especially when
the most terrible events are making a crisis In
the world, to return to a subject on which In the
past I have written many dispatches -— the pur
chase of-the Danish Antilles.
For seven years I
have hoped that the Department might instruct me
to make such suggestions to the Danish Government
as would lead to an offer of these islands to the
United States at a reasonable price.
For good
reason, I am sure, I received little encourage
ment .26

-^Ten Years, p. 260
^ I h e Lansing Parers* II, Egan to Secretary of State,
Ho. 833> Copenhagen, MaraEHB^ 1913_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---- T
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After this introduction, Egan gave an account of his past ef
forts to secure the islands.

Ke undoubtedly felt, and prob

ably with good reason, that this history lesson was necessary
to introduce Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan to the
basic facts of the case.

07

After outlining the plan he had

..submitted in September 1.910, Egan pointed out that if the
United States offered a high price for the territory, Banish
pride over losing her colonial possessions could be soothed.
He also told how he appealed to Banish pride when trying to
sway -opponents of the sales
0
v ,
’$■■■'
> '

. . . if they
the islands J were to remain a
burden to Denmark and a blot on the face of progress* as they were, it would be much better for
the national reputation of Denmark that they
should be sold to the United States.
This attitude was looked upon as reasonable.

Egan concluded his report by saying, "I have been impressed by
t^etfact that the State Department, not withstanding its pres^nt-arduous and grievous occupation, has kept its eyes fas
tened on probable contingencies which may result from the pre
sent war, and I take the liberty of calling attention to one
of these possible contingencies . . . .
» . ~rrr i ip i n mr miurn i n ■■■ i mmn m
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^ W r i t i n g later of a trip he made to Washington in the
spring of 1914 and of his conversation with Secretary Bryan,
Egan recalled, ”1 was touched by the benevolence, the charity,
and the extreme.ignorance of this man of genius . . . .
Mr.
Bryan did not seem to be really aware that I had come from
Europe at all.
I seemed to be looked on as a political ap
pointee, who had dropped from somewhere into a circle of
white-souled charity and religious beauty.” R ecollections,
p. 2 9 6 .

gain control over Denmark, the Danish West India Islands would
oQ
then he the property of Germany,"
Despite its somewhat impassioned tone* Egan's appeal
fell on deaf ears.

Fortunately for Egan* however, Bryan*s

State Department career was brief, and his successor, Robert
Lansing, was interested in United States acquisition of the
islands.
on June

Shortly after becoming Secretary of State ad Interim
9

$ 1915^ Lansing raised the question of- the purchase

with President Wilson.

After reading E g a n 1s dispatches, which

up, to this time had probably been neatly filed without a second
glaiiee, Wilson commented to Lansing, "I have read these papers
through with close attention, and thank you for handing wchem
to.vffle.

As I said to you yesterday, I am, and have-long been,

deeply interested in the purchase of the Danish West Indies.
I hope that you will take the matter up seriously and that it
mayt-he possible to have a concrete proposal, if possible in
the form of a treaty, to lay before the Senate at its next
session. ft
T29
Wilson's interest in the Danish West Indies was surpris
ing.

He had never revealed his feelings to Egan, nor had he

ever suggested to any of his key administration officials that
the issue should be actively pursued.

As during the Taft ad

ministration, government personnel seemed completely disinter-

02
estad in the subject during the early years of Wilson’s pres
idency.

Egan felt as though he had been working in a vacuum

since no administration official had ever commented on his ef
forts and he ’’had no . . , instructions . . . and very little
information as to what was going on in the minds of his coun30
trymen as to the expediency of the purchase.”
Ultimately,
if it had not been for Egan’s persistence, as Arthur Link
noted in his study of Wilson, the project would not have been
kept a l i v e.^
)
Egan finally received the encouragement he had been

soaking for so long on June 16, 1915s when Lansing sent a tel
egram whioh .said that the plan Egan had suggested in his dis
patch of March 8, 1915s was "desirable and may be feasible."
Lansing 'then advised Egan to approach the proper officials
"sfsery -discreetly" to ascertain whether a purchase offer by the
3?
United States would be accepted.

^0 Ten^Jfears, pp. 257-258.
-^Links o£. clt., p c 81.
*
i
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The Lansing Papers, II, Lansing to Egan, Tel. Ho. 27s
Washington,~”7)ime^^
some reason Egan seems to
have acted with extreme caution- in carrying out the Secre
tary *s instructions to approach the proper officials.
Perhaps
it was because he had been pursuing the goal for so long that
he wanted to prepare the ground before he approached Foreign
Minister Scavenius, or perhaps Scavenius was just not avail
able.
It was summer and many of the wealthy residents of
Copenhagen had left for their country estates.
Egan himself
was at Aalholra, the principal castle of Count Raben-Levetzau*
when he received a telephone message informing him of the
long-desired directive to reopen the island question (Ten
Years, pp. 264-266).
Egan gives a fascinating account~oT the
opening stages, of the negotiations but he seems to be more
storyteller than historian and telescopes the events of six
months into one vivid conversation.

Egan's first .interview -after receiving these instruc
tions was with Christian Helweg-Larsen, Governor of the Dan
ish- West Indies, who was visiting in Denmark,

Helweg-Larsen

emphasized from the beginning of the conversation that he was
against selling the Islands®

Denmark had already lost so much

territory, the Governor believed, "that the surrender of any
more would be a blow to the national prestige.”

Egan strongly

suspected that the Governor's attitude was influenced by a
■personal financial interest in the harbor development project
on /St. Thomas Island, since Larsen spoke of attending meetings
o f ^ h e directors of the East Asiatic Company —
tion^ sponsoring the harbor operation.

the organiza

Despite Egan’s argu- -

mest.s concerning the economic plight of the islands, the Gov
ernor held -firmly to his belief that the harbor improvements
wouIA .bring prosperity to the islands when the War e n d e d . ^
w - .-Egan's dispatch concerning this discussion failed to
• discourage Lansing,

Undaunted, he sent Egan a telegram re

questing him to expedite matters and udiscreetly and. confidantly speak to

theJ7. Minister for Foreign Affairs with the

view of ascertaining whether the Government of Denmark would
■^4
be ..willing to approach the subject of sale at this time."-'
Following Lansing’s -instructions, Egan consulted Danish
Foreign Affairs Minister Seavenius on August 18.

The next

day Egan telegrammed Lansing that Seavenius personally believed
the islands should be sold but thought immediate action on the
Question might be difficult to achieve in time of war.

Egan

added that though the Minister had not yet consulted his colleagues or public opinion,

"he felt that an offer generously

made, safeguarding the interests of the inhabitants, would be
“7[T
seriously c o n s i d e r e d . P r o m this point on, all negotiations
were carried on in secret.
were kept.

Talks were informal, and no records

Unfortunately, this makes it impossible to assess

Egan's exact role in the d e a l i n g s . ^
But while both governments deliberated, Egan did seek
out (influential Danes in an effort to get their support.

He

persevered in his campaign, begun years before, to convince
the Danish public that, the United States was "entirely in sym
pathy with any movement on the part of Denmark to improve the
"2S7
conditions of these islands."
E g a n rs dispatches to the State Department during this
period detailed the attitudes of the major European powers re
garding the sale.

Denmark was quite conscious of the opinions

of her powerful neighbors,

especially during World War I when

she was totally dependent on them for raw materials for her
Industries and the markets for her exports.

Widen rumors of an

^5'ihe Lansing Papers, tII, Egan to Secretary of State,
Tel. No. loo, Copenhagen, August 19, 1915.
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Ten Years, p. 266.
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*Foreign Relations Papers, Egan to Secretary of State,
No. 889? Copenhagen, November 1*9, 1915.

impending sale of the islands appeared in Banish papers, Henry
lowtheiv the British Minister? told Egan that he continually
advised his government to support the United States position.
Egan assumed Lowther voiced the opinion of his government since
-^8
he never openly expressed his ora feelings*"
Among Egan*s
other diplomatic colleagues, only French Minister Bapst ohejected to the actions of the United States.

39

Germanys of course, was the one nation whose attitude
Egan studied most carefully.

It was unlikely that the Germans

would oppose the sale of the islands since at this time they
were anxious to remain at peace with the United States.

Even

wh§n rumors of revolutions in the Banish Antilles revived press
speculation of a Banish offer to sell the islands to the United
States, Egan reported that the German Minister to Benmark, Count
Brpc&dorff-Kantzau, was 11entirely indiff©rent” to these stories.

38Ibid.
39
.
Foreign Relations Papers, Egan to Secretary of State.
leu. No. 1o9» Copenhagen, August 7? 1916.
Egan 3_ater wrote,
however, that Bapst ”had very unjustly been accused of being
against the sale.” Ten Years, p . 269.
In this same account, Egan spoke of Lowther, the British
Minister, as being ”frankly delighted” that the question of
the sale was to be reopened.
Ten Years, p. 270.
Still later, though, in his Recollections, p. 238, Egan
wrote:
”A careful study of what.might be called 1 unedited doc
uments1 had ..taught me that neither England, nor France was de
sirous that we should possess those islands, but England espe
cially disliked the idea.” These apparent inconsistencies in
E g a n !s opinions may be the result of further information he
got in later years with .regard to the French Minister's pri
vate views and the British Government1s official view.
Eng
land., despite her unspoken opposition, was desirous of keep
ing in time of world war the good wili of a then neutral United
States and so kept her true feelings on the subject of the sale
to herself.
■x
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"On the "basis'of other information," Egan'was convinced Hno
German influence would he brought to hear on the /”Danish_7
Foreign Office" to prevent a s a l e . ^

Lansing, still fearing

a German encroachment on the Danish Antilles, disagreed with
Egan; hut E g a n ’s interpretation of Germany’s position at this
time was correct.

41

An examination of German newspaper reac

tion to the signing and the ratification of the treaty by both
the United States and Denmark substantiates his views.

The

few German newspapers still extant from the period indicate
that throughout the seven months that it took to complete ne
gotiations for the exchange, Germany appeared to have been
totally concerned with matters of war and was completely dis
interested in the -territorial politics of her neutral northern
neighbor. v What little press coverage was given to the subject
of:.sthe sale was entirely factual, unemotional, and unbiased.

42

^ F o r e i g n Relations Parers, Egan to Secretary of State,
Ho..889* Copenhagen, November 19? 1915.
^ E g a n ’s beliefs had changed considerably from the time
of his arrival in Copenhagen.
Even so, he occasionally did
refer to- fears- of a German take-over when reporting to the
State Department.
These contradictions in his opinions can
he.explained.
Undoubtedly, he was using the Department’s fear
of German encroachment as a tool to prod the United States Gov
ernment into speeding up negotiations for the sale, thus allow
ing him to fulfill his dream.
Egan was completely convinced
by 1915 that Germany was too taken up with war matters to be
concerned about the islands.
Ten Years, p. 259.
o
^ F r a nkfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt, Decemher 14-17*
1916.
At the time of""the plebiscite in Denmark when the pop
ulace voted in favor of the sale, no mention was made in this
paper of the event.
The only coverage given Denmark concerned
her commerce.
Topics.of a war nature seemed to take precedence
over all other topics.
In' January 1917 when the two countries exchanged ratifi
cations, the following brief unemotional account appeared in

67
Even the pro-German Danish newspaper Berlingske Tidende, loath
to express an opinion concerning the proposed sale, weighed
”the pros and cons of the situation in a composed way and put
the responsibility £^~of a decision^/ 011 ^ ie shoulders of the
b
y~DanishJ7 Cabinet and the Diet."
This reaction by a proGerman parer contrasted sharply with K<?fbenhavn and the / other_7
-*•

conservative
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DanishJ7 newspapers /~which_J7 reacted very vio-

lently against the sale*
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With little or no opposition from Denmark's neighbors,
American-Danish discussions continued from August until October
,|1915.

The Danes did their best to negotiate for a high price.

ytTbeir position was difficult, however.

The economic conditions

•gjji -ther island s we r e fas t i e t eri o rating -d.esp I te —the hap e,s. that
the Panama Canal would bring prosperity, and Danish financiers
g&s well >■as the public again had lost interest in the territory.

-^Denmark's position was further strained as her extensive social
programs continued to put a heavy drain on the country's eco-

Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt, January 19? 1917% p . 2.
TXTtranslation from t h e ~ G e m a n T nTSa5ish Minister in Washing
ton telegraphed:
’The exchange of ratifications of the con
ventions from the fourth of August, 1916, concerning the trans
fer of the Danish West Indian Islands to the United States took
place January 1?, in Washington, between the Danish Minister
and the American Secretary of State.’M
When the purchase was completed, no mention of the event
appeared.
Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt, April 2-7,
1917.
"^Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt, August 6, 1916,
iTi~n ir~»^i~m~r~ninTiiiiif|-*. mm-raTrrnnWiw « — r n r n n ii r T i m w n ■
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nomlc resources, Jh5
..Secretary Lansing so urgently desired to purchase the
islands*' however, that he ignored these facts and actually
played into the hands of the Lanes by pressuring them to sell.
Lansing even went so far as to threaten them with the sugges
tion that the United States might have to occupy the islands
if .-Denmark lost sovereignty over them,

He made his threat on

November 15? when the Danish. Minister Constantin Brun called
on him to inquire whether "the United States would feel it
necessary to take the Islands if Denmark should decide not to
sell,M

Lansing responded:

V&-I had not considered this action to be necessary
v as I hoped we could get them by formal negotia'^-tions•but that I could conceive of circumstances
■which .would compel such action on our part:
ab
sorption* of Denmark by some great power; or the
r- ..sale. forced or voluntary? of the islands to ant r o t h er’European power which would seek to convert
them to a naval b a s e , 46
Egar%*who knew nothing of Lansing's pressure tactics? was
4*7
later embarrassed by them, 1
..Paced with Lansing's threat? Denmark set a high price
for the islands despite her awkward position*

The United

States in :its overzealous desire to possess the territory was
forced to accept,

.Lansing .reluctantly agreed to a sum of

Lansing Papers, II, Egan to Secretary of State,
Ho. 833? March # 7 1 9 1 5 /
~"
^°The Lansing Papers, II, Lansing to President Wilson,
Washing t onJTl^crember 4, 19'15'7~as quoted in Lansing, "Drama of
the Virgin Islands Purchase," o p . cit., p. 4,
47

See text, pp. 71-72-

$25 million even though he considered it to be excessive.
Having coerced Denmark into the sale, or so he thought, he
48
was not in a position to haggle over the price.
The blame for this excessive cost should not be placed
entirely on Lansing, however.

Wilson was so anxious to com

plete the sale that he was not inclined to debate the price
either.

5,It would be a mistake to break off at this evidently

opportune time on the.question of money, within reasonable
_

bounds,” he wrote to his Secretary of State in January 1916.

49

¥.ilsonfs sense of iirgency was apparently prompted by a General
Hoard of the Navy report to him in December 1915, which stated
that “the Virgin Islands had harbors that would make good na
val bases and that the United States could not safely permit
a ipotential enemy to acquire the Islands.”
3 ?
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Many Americans shared Lansing’s dissatisfaction with the

d'pst of\the islands.

Although the New York Times consistently
^

mm. mmm .

r^.'mt-Tmrmrmmm-mmmt-mmm.

V

favored the purchase, its first reaction was that the price
was a “preposterously extravagant sum.”

A Times editorial

stated that the defensive value of the islands might induce
the United States “to pay for them more than they are worth,”
but "five-times their estimated value . . . A ’wasJ/7 entirely
too much.”

Anticipating a Congressional rejection of the

^ The Lansing Papers, II, Lansing to Egan, Tel. No, 6 7 ,
¥ a shIngton T J anuarv 10,™ 19"16.
49
' The Lansing Papers, II, ¥.¥. to R. Lansing, January
1 9 1916.
Tans ill,

op

Dewey to J. Daniels, December 10, 1915» quoted in
. cit,, pp. 481-'483.

treaty, the paper claimed "the Senate would

not ratify

it, the

House of Representatives would not appropriate the money,
the general populace would concur.
over the price.
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and

Even Egan was shocked

Nevertheless, he knew that the United States’

offer had to be as generous as possible if the Danish Landsting was to approve the sale.
The formal signing of the treaty was delayed.
Denmark
ro
desired minor concessions ■ and was wary of the international
■situation.

In April 1916 Egan reported that the Danish For

eign Office had informed him that rumors of strained relations
between the United States and Germany were the sole cause of
delay,.

Egan promised the State Department that "as soon as I

can overcome the fear, the negotiations will proceed smoothly.
Egan* s assumption was correct, and on August 4, the treaty was
signed in New York.
V.

Now began the real battle —

a fierce, four-month polit

ical fight in Denmark, where members of the opposition tried
to postpone the issue until after the War.

When this move

failed, some of them tried to force an election for a new Rigs

New York Times, July 26, 1916, p. 10.
CO
-^The Lansing Papers, 11, Egan to Secretary of State,
Tel. Ho. 24o7'^0openhagen, April 2?, 1916, and Lansing to Egan,
Tel. Ho. 110, Washington, June 9* 1916.
Q1he differences concerned concessions enjoyed by Danish
firms and Individuals In the islands and over Denmark’s insist
ence that-the United States reaffirm Denmark’s claim to the
whole of Greenland.
Wilson insisted on yielding on all points
Link, cp. cit., p. 82.
^ F o r e ign Relations Papers, Egan to Secretary of State,
Now 917f’'"Copenhagen, April 10,~T916.
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dag, another attempt to put off the issue.■

The United States

'would have been forced into war with Germany before a new Dan
ish government could have resolved the conflict.

Ultimately

the question.of ceding the islands was submitted to a special
commission representing all the political parties-

It was

given six weeks to investigate the entire matter and issue a
report of its findings *

Fourteen days after the report was

published, a plebiscite was held to decide the. sale question.
Egan was only an Interested spectator during most of
this political wrangling; but he did step into the fray whenever h e saw an opportunity to help that would not undermine
his. -delicate diplomatic position.

Two instances of his activ

ity I n “behalf of the sale are particularly noteworthy.
The first revolved around an incident stemming from the
nhighppressure?? remarks Lansing had made -earlier to Minister
When the story about Lansing's views broke in the Dan
ish press,-a tense political situation quickly developed.

In

an effort to minimize the tension, Egan issued an official,
public, denial of the "pressure” charges.

In reporting the

story of .Egan’s denial, the conservative newspaper National

M U M C M ja n ta tia n riK m ;

c

.Tidende, which opposed the sale, published an account of an
interview with a high State Department official which supported
Egan's pronouncement.

But, according to National Tidende, the

official — - a Counselor--Polk —

also had indicated that the

United States Senate was delaying ratification of the sale
—■—

i

iit ^

^^Ten Years, pp. 272-274.
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treaty in reaction to the high $25 million price tag and had
suggested the Senate would not act on the matter during its
current session.

If true, Egan knew this news would have

had a devastating effect in the 'Rigsdag and would have destroy
ed all possibility of concluding the sale.
Egan immediately querried his Washington superiors about
the Interview's authenticity.

Assured that it was false and

that there were no serious obstacles in the Senate,

56

Egan

then launched a full-*scale attack against National Tidende and
n r tw r c . rw* " a c s its a r— r w a w r n f t - i f i ,

its article, including a public charge that the paper had been
duped into printing a fabricated interview.

The enraged ha-

tional Tidende responded by calling Egan a liar since, It said*
the United States State Department had not officially denied
the. interview or the Information it contained.

Ultimately,

this lieated exchange, which lasted for several days, proved to
bpuquite beneficial to the American position.

It pushed the

question of the United States’ pressure tactics far Into the
background and re3.ieved the strain placed on the Danish Eoreigi
Office by Lansing s .unfortunate remarks.

57

The only adverse

effect it had,- according to Egan, was that the United States
Minister was no longer "in the opinion of the whole press,
the sweet and promising young poet of sixty-five, who had

^ Foreign Rela tions Papers, Egan to Secretary of State
Tel* No«~"3'23* Copenhagen, -August 23? 1916; Ten Years, p. 278
5 SThe
h Lansing
M Papers, II,
_
Lansing to Egan, Tel. No. 155?
Wa s h m g t on , Augu st 24, 1916.
^ N e w York Times, August 29? 1916, p. 7; and Ten Years
pp. 278-281.
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written sonnets.
Egan also worked diligently in 1916 to induce the re
cently enfranchised female voters to side with the United
States on the Danish ¥est Indies question,

The consensus was

that Danish women would vote against the sale for sentimental,
and patriotic reasons,

Egan began to lecture widely to women's

groups in order to -change the feminine view.

On one occasion

Madame Gad, a leading feminist, arranged for Egan to give an
evening lecture for charity at Politiken Bus on ”The American
HQ
Woman and Her Aspirations.’*

A capacity crowd attended, and

bpth the Copenhagen and provincial papers published favorable
reports of Egan's performance.

Egan's campaign to woo female

vqtes! was so successful that he received a great deal of mail
fr.onr both individuals and w o m e n ’s organizations pledging ei
ther ,to vote for the sale or at least to abstain from voting
HO
against it.
A comparatively small number of ballots were cast when
the plebiscite tooh place on December 14, 1916.

Approximately

254,000 voted for the sale and 153,000 against it.

Shortly

after, the Rigsdag voted for ratification, and on January 17,
61
1917 j the.exchange of ratifications took place*
The United

5^Ten years, p. 278,
^ A m e r i c a n women had still not obtained the vote and
this caused many of the Danes to doubt the quality of Amer
ican democracy.
^ T e n Years, p p . 284-296.
Q<Foreign Relations Papers, Egan to Secretary of State,
Copenhagen, "Tel. Nos. 397”? December 15? 1916; 401, December
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States Senate had long before approved the treaty,'

Egan

could not yet congratulate himself for eleven years of work
well done.

Despite the exchange of ratifications,

it took two

more months for the United States to obtain full title to the
islands.

It was not until March 31, 1917, just fifty-two

hours before President Wilson delivered his war message in the
Capitol, that the Virgin Islands came fully under the sover
eign jurisdiction of the United States *

20, 1916; 402, December 21, 1916; 405, December 22, 1916,
U*S. Treaties, 1913-21 (Wilson), Convention Between the
United States and D enmark. Cession of the Danish West Indies:
'Treaty Serie s Do . 3 2 9 , Washington,’ 19T 5”
^Wilson had sent the treaty to the Senate on August 8*
and Lansing bluntly warned the Foreign Relations Committee'on
August 18 that Denmark might sell the islands to some other
power if the United States did not pay the price demanded.
That, he added, would be a direct challenge to the Monroe Doc
trine.
The Senate, after a favorable report by the Foreign
Relations Committee on September 5, debated the treaty in ex
ecutive session for only two hours on September 7 and consent
ed to ratification by a huge majority,
hew York Times, Sep
tember 8, 1917.

CHAPTER IT
WORLD WAR I
With the outbreak of hostilities among the Great Euro
pean powers .in 1914 all Scandinavia felt endangered.

People

showed their fears by runs on banks and by hoarding food.
Banks and governments reacted differently at first, but all
recognized the existence of an overwhelming outside force
"over whose actions they had no control.

The Scandinavian peo~

4

ibles became imbued with a-sense of weakness in their innocence,
of uncertainty from, day to day, of want through no fault of
their own, and of deep disillusionment in the good faith and
"'intelligence of men.

So with national existence at stake the

Whole of Scandinavia became neutrality minded.”*
Denmark, following the pattern set by the rest of Scan
dinavia, immediately took steps to protect its economic inter
ests.

The near financial panic that accompanied the outbreak

of war made it necessary to close the Copenhagen Stock Exchange
and to declare a moratorium on the conversion of bank notes in
to gold.

On August

prohibited.

6

exportation of a long list of goods was

At almost the same time an attempt was made in

cooperation with Industriraadet (the Danish Chamber of Manu-

*Franklin D. Scott, The United States and Scandinavia
(Cambridge, 1950), pp. 21.1, 213-

faeturers) to facilitate deliveries of goods to overseas buy
ers 'by securing promises from manufacturers not to take advan
tage of the state of war and suspend contracts.

Denmark was

also greatly concerned with deliveries of coal imports, for
the price of coal had doubled within a few days and no one
knew whether more supplies could be obtained from. England,
Thus it was with some relief that the Danes received assur
ances from, the British that their exports would continue as
much as possible provided the Danish Government guaranteed
that the imported British coal would not be re-exported to
England1s enemies.

Further government steps included the es

tablishment on August 7, 1914, of price controls on-food and
other essential commodities and the issuance on August 11 of
an-vordinanee* decreeing a reduction of twenty-five per cent In
thf price of coal.

In.order to encourage both foreign and do

mestic shipping companies to risk their ships and crews to de
liver coal, the government arranged a War Risk Insurance scheme
on August 11 with four Danish marine insurance firms.

This

plan required the shipping companies to pay only twenty-five
per cent of the premiums, with the Danish Government funding
• ?~
the rest.
.The Danish Court was generally sympathetic to the Allied
cause, -and-King Christian X sent a personal representative,
Statsraad H.H. Andersen, to London to establish close ties with
the British Government,

Despite the Kin g fs sympathy for Great
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^Marion C. Siney, The Allied Blockade of Germany,
(Ann Arbor, 1957), p. 45.
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Britain's position, however, those In Banish governmental circles were ’concerned that ..Germany would take reprisals against
Denmark if Banish export policy was too favorable to the Al
lies, especially the English*

It wan especially feared that

the Germans would capture the hey port of Esb^erg on the west
coast of Jutland.

Denmark, therefore, was quite anxious to

make .the world aware of her desire to remain outside the con
flict*.

She took several measures to publicize this intention,

largely for the benefit of her German neighbors.

On August 1

the first of several official proclamations of Banish neutral
ity was made in a royal message.

The next day the Eigsdag

parsed an act prohibiting the provisioning of belligerent war
ships I n _Banish ports.

On August 3 and 6 the Government mined

vtkq approaches to the Baltic in the hope that the action would
prevent naval conflict in her territorial waters."'
:-y „■ Appeasement of the Germans, however, was not the sole
motive for these measures to ensure Banish neutrality.

They

were equally motived by the Banes' desire to avoid any in
volvement in the Allied system of economic control and to es
cape the consequences of failing to -accede to British demands
for Denmark's compliance.

Although she did not border on any

of.,the Allied Powers, Denmark was highly susceptible to any

-Pal1e lauring, A H istory of the Kingdom of Denmark
(Copenhagen, i9 6 0 ), p. 23&7- Germany had threatened to lay
the mines in Banish waters herself unless Denmark closed them
off.
So, after discussions with Great Britain, who would
otherwise have disapproved strongly, thus imposing serious
consequences on Denmark’s economic life, the Banes chose the
latter course of action.

economic pressure from, them, as well as from the Germans.

The

Allies controlled the sea lanes and xvere In a position to pre
vent vital raw materials and other overseas imports from reach
4
in g D an 1 sh ports.
Despite these problems, Denmark, while preserving her
neutral

status, succeeded in maintaining a precarious economic

balance during *the early years of the War by trading with the
belligerent nations.

Denmark was, in fact, the best example

of the mutual tolerance showed by the belligerents.

She sold

food.to Germany, but in order to produce food, she had to Imp o r t ,animal fodder from Britain,

To obtain the fodder, she

also/liad to sell food to Britain, the.chief buyer of Danish
butfer, bacon, and eggs.

The Germans tacitly allowed this

trade In order to obtain the supplies they needed from Denmark
In oafe .case they captured and then deliberately released two
sklp%.'.bound with food for Britain.

Likewise, the British

Government had to consent to the re-exportation of at least
small amounts of British-made goods because it realized that
Germany might undertake reprisals against Denmark if the Brit
ish Government refused these concessions.

Even if Germany did

not undertake military measures against Denmark, the Allies
were morally obligated to provide the Danes with the articles
they usually imported from Germany if in retaliation these

were cut off.

For England this would have involved a reallo

cation of raw materials and tonnage at a time when the scarcity of tonnage was becoming a problem of greatest importance
to the Allies,

The Danes were thus in an excellent position
7
to play one belligerent off against the other.'
It was in this sensitive economic and political climate
that Maurice Francis Egan operated the United States Legation
in Denmark.

His task was difficult from the beginning, but

his problems multiplied when the United States entered the
war.

In spite of them, however, he performed his official

dpties well.

He also tried to make the most of his opportuni

ties to be somewhat of a political observer, although his col
l o g u e s often questioned the wisdom of his views on current
...affairs. ,.These opportunities arose from both his official
ppgltion and the geographical location of his post.

Oopen-

often referred to by many diplomats of the day as ?,tke
whispering gallery of E u r o p e V was an ideal place to glean
useful intelligence because of its proximity to the major
European powers and its key location in widely trafficked
European shipping lanes.

It was the spiritual center of numer

ous new social and political movements -- especially socialism
which had made great inroads into Danish internal politics de
spite the -fact that Denmark is one of the oldest continuous
.monarchies in the world.

The capital also provided an oppor

tunity to study the effect that a large, powerful nation could

have on the affairs of a small, relatively weak neighbor,
According to Egan, few persons benefited from Denmark’s pro
pinquity to the German "menace,"

f,In 1907-8-9-10-11 , no ex

perience in watching German methods seemed of much value to
B
our own people £ the Americans J7 or to England.”
In reality, even Egan failed to benefit from the experi
enee he claimed this proximity to Germany provided until $ust
•a.year before war broke out.

Throughout the period 1907-1 3 »

he never saw any proximate danger of war although the factors
• that caused the continent to erupt in 1914 smoldered all durinutile period,

Eis thinking was consistently pervaded by

.naive, idealistic notion that somehow' men were too gentle
m§nly and war too costly for such a horrible thing to happen,
He must be given credit, however, for correctly prophesying
the area ‘Where the holocaust would be ignited.

In 1908 he

commented, that the Balkans was the area to watch for trouble
if .it was to occur? this region was "the Aetna and Vesuvius
of ,the diplomatic world-.”-'

Still he failed, like so many

others of his era, to assess the importance of the violent
winds of revolution and change brewing in that rugged region
• of southern Europe,

At the height of the tension between

Austria, and Serbia in 1909, which was caused by Austria’s an
nexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egan contended that no
real threat of war existed because a conflict would be too ex

B

Ten Tears, p. 55.
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pensive for both sides.

He held steadfastly to this view-de

spite the fact that all of his diplomatic colleagues dls~
10
agreed.
In early March 1909? he wrote to Secretary of State
Knox that "any opinion of the possibility of Austria /” slo JJ
moving on to Belgrade and precipitating war will be discounted
before this reaches you*3:

He carefully qualified his remarks

by adding that .most diplomats in Copenhagen believed differ
ently and, were extremely concerned over a possible outbreak
of. war.

11

Surprisingly* in the same dispatch Egan showed keen

insight into the. pattern of alignments which would take place
among the. powers in just five and one-half years*

He related

that the Austrian Minister, Count Szechenyi, had told
hfpi1 tha t .Austria, should punish Serbia at once.

The Russians

in Copenhagen insisted that any such action by Austria would
force the Ozar to support Serbia, a move which would be quickl^yaecepted by the Russian people •
15they Z~”the Russian people J

Russian diplomats claimed

would welcome a war against Aus

tria as an opportunity to show that their army can do what
their fleet failed to do in the Japanese lfar.u

Egan acknow

ledged that If faced with such s. threat Austria would need aid
from her German allies but- he discounted the possibility that
this aid would be forthcoming.

12

Hot only Egan*s diplomatic colleagues, but the .'Danes
1-f

'Hi

'Olbld., pp. 92-94-.
11
Foreign Relations Papers, E g a n t o Secretary o f State
n o M o ., Cope n h a gen, Marc h 17~T909«
^^Ibid

•

as well, did not share Egan’s opinion that the Germans would
avoid aimed conflict.

The memory of the conquest of Schleswig

Holstein was still too fresh in Danish minds.

The Danes “be

lieved that Germany was headed toward war in Europe and that
it would he only a matter of time before they seized Denmark.
Eow best to .remain neutral «« and independent —
hotly debated In the Danish Rigsdag..

1

was a subject

The conservatives wanted

to build defensive fortifications and train troops while more
radical groups argued that this would be a waste of money
since it could only delay, not prevent, the inevitable should
Germany attack.

Between these polarized opinions lay numerous

V

other views about the appropriate action to take.
Though he was thoroughly convinced that Germany did not
want war, Egan, nevertheless, was well aware of her use of
economic, political, cultural, and even religious means in her
attempt to secure control over the Danes.

Ultimately he real

ized that the results would be the same as a military conquest
as far as United States-Banish relations were concerned.

14

Egan also believed that the arbitration movement would
1*5
be effective In maintaining world peace.
The movement had
m il in i n~rrr~n m i n thittrrTrmm irirnn 11 i • n iirririi mi i~i*ir m
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^ T e n Years, p. 39 ff.
ih
‘ Ibid., pp. vii-Ix, 91*
German attempts at commercial
domination were not restricted solely to Denmark, however,
During trips to the Netherlands and Belgium, Egan observed
that "Germany loomed large" over these countries as well as
over Denmark.
He judged that Germany was bent on commercial
sup remac y everywhere.
^Paradoxically, the movement was reaching new heights
just at the time World War I broke out.
The United States had in May 1903 signed an arbitration

received new impetus in March 1913 when William Jennings Bryan,
one of the leading proponents, of the peace movement, became
Secretary of State in the Wilson Cabinet.

Within a month af

ter taking office, Bryan had outlined a plan for an extensive
series.of arbitration treaties between the United States and
several other countries of the world,

According to this plan,

both parties would agree to submit all questions, without ex
ception, to an investigating commission and would abstain from
hostilities until the commission had made its report.
mission was to consist of five men.

The com

Each disputing nation was

t o „choose one frera its own population and one from a foreign
state.

The fifth member was to be selected by the two nations

together.

The commission’s report would only be advisory, but

the time taken to prepare it would provide a cooling-off period
t h a % w o u l d allow many disputes to settle themselves.

Bryan

alsoxthought that the-weight of world public opinion would in
duce the two disputing countries to accept the commission’s

treaty with,.Denmark by which disputes of a legal nature or
those relating to the interpretation of treaties would be sub
mitted to .the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague,
whenever ordinary diplomatic means had failed and both parties
agreed to submit the case in question to The Hague court.
In
any such case the two countries were to make a special agreement defining the .matter in dispute, the scope of the powers
of the arbitrators, the periods to be fixed for the formation
of the arbitral tribunal, and the several stages of the pro
cedure.
This was not unlimited arbitration, by any means,
however; either country could withhold submission of any case
which it considered to affect its vital interests, threaten
its independence, or threaten Its honor, or concern the inter
ests of a, third party.
U.S. Treaties, 1901-09 (Roosevelt), Convention Between
the United States and Denmark, Arbitration, Treaty Series Ho.
520 {Washington, 1909).
‘
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decision.“^
Bryan’s proposal was well received throughout the world
and thirty treaties were negotiated by the United States, al
though only twenty of these were ever ratified and their term
were not so sweeping as proposed in Bryan's original plan.
The United States treaty with Denmark was signed in Washing
ton on February 5? 1914.

But whatever satisfaction the sign

i n g may have given Bryan was short-lived, as the Senate made
it plain that it would not approve the treaty.

On April 17?

1914, a second United States-Danish treaty, providing merely
f for use of the commission system, was signed and eventually
17
*,-.ratif l e d .

Bryan exulted in his success, but his triumphs

,:ywere hollow and pathetic because World War I had already
18
started before most of the treaties had been ratified.
■!>' ■

Despite his overly optimistic expectations that peace
0 WQuld continue in Europe, Egan was not completely taken by
^ -surprise when hostilities began in August 1914.

As ear3.y as

1.908 Egan felt that German financiers were "growing more and
more furiously jealous of England £ and wanted_7 to make a

18

Merle E. Ourti, Bryan and World Peace, "Smith College
Studies in History," vol. XVI, nos. 3™4*°=Tllo'rthamptons Mass.,
April-July, 1931), p. 150.
^ U . S . Treaties, 1913*21 (Wilson), Treaty for the Advancement of General Peace, Concluded Between the Unitea
States and Denmark, Treaty Series Ho. 6 Co (Washington, 1915).
See also U.S. Foreign Relations, 1915, pp..276-78. and Foreign Relations.Papers, Constantin Brun to Secretary of State
Bryan* Washington, March 28, 1914,. for astatement
of Denmark
dissatisfaction over the failure of thefirst treaty.
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financial wilderness of London and reconstruct the money center- of the world in Berlin."

19

Other facts such as the per

sistent build-up of the German ITavy caused him to doubt his
earlier views and by early 1.914- those convictions became ab
solutely untenable for him.
to war.

He realized that Europe was clos

When he received secret information in early 1914-

about -Russian and German*intentions, Egan prepared for w a r ’s
imminent outbreak;.

He obtained the information, from two Rus

sian diplomats, Prince Kaudacheff, one-time Russian minister
to Copenhagen, and Michael Bibikoff, secretary of the Russian
Legation.

He had become friendly with these men years earlier

and from, time to time they had given him information about
conditions in Russia and the diplomatic intentions of Russia,
Austria, 'Germany, and the Balkan countries.
r'f,

In February 1914, Bibikoff, then stationed in Munich,

s l a n g e d ,to meet clandestinely with Egan in a Copenhagen ho
tel to pass to him confidential information about Russian and
German, maneuverings.

Bibikoff even went so far during their

meeting tc predict that war would start no later than Septem
ber 1914.

Though Bibikoff substantiated his assertions with

proofs which were a bit amazing, the startled Egan readily
.accepted them because he knew, as he later recalled, "at Mu
nich he / ”Bibikoff_7 had access to much information, and I
knew him well enough to understand that, if there was any se~
OQ
erst information to be had, he would manage to get it."

^ R e c o l l e c t i o n s , pp. 293-294.
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Hotably absent from any of these talks were discussions about
Austria and Serbia.

Egan was understandably preoccupied with

the subject of Germany.
Bibikoff knew well the attitudes of the ruling factions
in Russia and predicted that Russia would soon be forced to
fight because she-believed.Germany was determined to leave her
no other choice.

He expected Italy to remain neutral in any

conflict among the powers.
Austria, he reasoned,

Since she was not bound to aid

she had nothing to gain by assisting the

Austrians unless Germany and Austria together could offer her
great- territorial expansion opportunities.

He believed Italy

would not aid France either because of certain very evident
jealousies between them.

“Unless. England came to her rescue,"

Bibikoff gloomily forewarned, "France was doomed."
■0
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. Egan had to promise his Russian friend that he would not
-a written report about their conversation to the Depart

ment? of State or use Bibikoff’s name in United States Legation
dispatches.

Since Egan had already planned a trip to the

United States to lecture at Harvard, however, the promise in
no way hindered his reporting the vital information to his
Washington superiors.
Stats in person«

He simply briefed the Secretary of

Bryan, unfortunately, was totally uninter

ested and dismissed Egan's report as inconsequential.

An op

portunity to circumvent the Secretary’s indifferent attitude
arose when -Egan■had a short five-minute conference with Pres-t r —

21 Ibid., p. 294.

w w a i »■* wnnrag&y»'«CT.,*.oacngc*»«ac«flSCgs

ident Wilson shortly thereafter,

Wilson was not well at the

time though* so Egan decided to put off his revelation for a
more appropriate occasion.
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But Egan, became ill a,nd "before

a second meeting between the two men could be arranged Egan's
news was no longer relevant.

While Egan was still recuper

ating .from a kidney.operations Archduke Francis Ferdinand was
assassinated and Europe was at w a r . ^
When he was released from the hospital* Egan disregarded
his doctor's advice and took the first available steamship for
pA
Copenhagen, arriving there on August 24.
Back at his post,
he;soon found that the American legation was ill-equipped both
i^.;#taff and office space to take care of the increased dePR
.rnspds for its services created by the war.
The staff, which
at-.the beginning consisted of five persons, including the min*»

■l- . 22ibia., pp. 2 9 5 -2 9 6 .
^0.1bid. 9 pp. 293-299.
Egan had left Denmark on March 2.5
1914, intending to give a series of eight lectures at Harvard
on the subject of "Typical Christian Hymns in Common Use*,s
These were to end on May 12, and he was then to make another
speaking tour through the South under the auspices of the
Southern Commercial Congress, similar to his tour in 1912*
This would have ended about the third week in June*
However,
he 'was. taken seriously ill in the latter part of May, as re
ported in the New York Tim e s , May 26, 1914, p. 5s and he was
op
ed on in Providence"Hospital, Washington, D.G.
It was
not until August ?, 1914, that he was discharged from the
hospital.
^ I b id., p. 299.
WoeOOrtTewsmtre

^ T e n Years, p. 301,
Egan could have rented a satisfac
tory building -- on "urgent request" to the State Department but the coal bill, which would h a v e .amounted to about. |3,000
a year, was prohibitive since the State Department would not
allot added funds for fuel.
Egan, estimated that it would have
cost about 120,000 to put the United States Legation on an ef
ficient wartime basis.
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Ister, was gradually Increased, but Its size was never com
pletely adequate.

Too many tasks were demanded of it.

Den

mark because of its neutrality had become a haven for Ameri
cans who had been stranded in Germany at the outbreak of war.
Many without papers or money turned to the American Minister
for help.

During the first month of the war, the Legation

spent over #8*000 just for telegrams sent to relatives of
stranded Americans. . As time passed, many of the refugees be
came -wards of the Legation.

Most were grateful for the aid

they received but there were also those who were completely
thankless*

Egan in his memoirs cited one Southern schoolmas-

Jff.r who thought that the United States Government should have
prevented the war so that he could have continued his tour of
tEurope without interruption.
t0he man announced to Egan.

WI am forty-two years of age,'*

”1 have saved #2,000 and I have

|t©;eke& forward to this trip all my life.
sfche fault of my own government,

How largely through

I am obliged to go back with

out seeing anything I really expected to see.
26
vote the Democratic ticket again.’5 '

I shall never

Egan Vs activities were not restricted solely to aiding
stranded Americans during the w a r ’s first few months.

Neu-

^Recollections, up, 300-301.
Egan added that the United
States Government was generous in making funds available for
the use of stranded Americans.
But if this had been lacking,
Adolph Stein, the representative of the Standard Oil Company
in Denmark, and a close friend of E g a n ’s, had offered the Le
gation the use of the Standard Oil funds in his safe should the
need arise.
Egan believed that this fact should be recorded to
show the gpod intentions of the company "at a time whan every
demagogue throws a stone at the Standard Oil Corporation . .
SI^
•

a
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tral Denmark continued to "00 an excellent location for gather
ing .intelligence, and although he was badly handicapped by
limited financial and personnel resources, the American Min
ister supplied the State Department with a constant stream of
reports containing news about Germany, Russia, Denmark, and
other .European countries,,

He also kept busy feeding decep

tive-tidbits of information to the numerous spies living in
the city --."the ultra-American young woman from San Erancisco
or the young man with the painfully acquired English accent.”
If used, the information Egan provided "must have brought
.-27
them to disaster."
Another .of E g a n 1s numerous responsibilities was the task
•of wprking with the Danish legal authorities to protect the
rights of American firms doing business in Denmark.

Since the

United States did not enter the War until 191T » American firms
so If*, gqo.ds to both groups of belligerents during the War *s
first three years.

They shipped their goods to Germany and

the other Entente powers through neutral countries like Den
m ark because of the .British blockade.

Large concerns like the

.Swift and *Armour meat-packing .companies, for example, even es
tablished „branch offices in Copenhagen.

In late Hovember 1914,

an alarmed, British Restriction of Enemy Supply Committee re
ported that Copenhagen had■become a large-scale base of supply
f o r tinned meat and lard:

over one million pounds of lard had

been imnorted into Denmark in October 1914 alone, and meat im-

-

1

Ibid•, p p . 301-302
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ports had tripled..

Moreover* there were similar increases in

oil* rubber, and copper orders.
The British attempted to stop this roundabout trade with
Germany by stopping and censoring mail sent between Denmark
and the United States and by holding up all commercial cable
grams between the two nations.

This was quite easy since

•they owned the cable connecting Denmark with the United States.
Orders could never be filled, the British reasoned, if they
never reached the suppliers.

American businessmen were highly

annoyed with these British practices-and besieged Egan with
ealljs .for help.

Though sympathetic, he was powerless to do

anything -except relay the complaints to the Department of State.
In fact,, he was faced with the same problem himself.

The Amer

ican'.;Legation in Denmark did not have a "diplomatic pouch ser%

vice1! -until late in .the War, and the British censors were hold
ing iip the Legation's mail, t o o . ^
The attention the Legation staff devoted to businessmen®s
problems and commercial transactions soared when Britain set
out to seriously restrain foreign trade with the Entente pow
ers.

.Men,who had been totally unconcerned about war rumors

Just a few short months before suddenly demanded vast amounts
of information concerning German activities.

Egan, in disgust,

remarked later that "knowing the ability of our businessmen
m i l l ■■.iwnn ■I.n

mu iwn i iii ) i» i im nmm i i mm i i t h — n n r n i m nnviTit-^'T*1-*— i f t itt*—

- f . .as-.f-Tjrni wrrT.iT » « n w i

n

.1. i . .. ..

....

“^Siney, on. cit., pp, 45-48.
on _

-•koreign Relations Papers, Egan to Secretary of State,
Tel, Ho. 269, Copenhagen, July 14, 191o.
This even included
mail from the Legation to the Secretary of State in Washington.

and their knowledge of affairs in Europe,

* • . I was aston

ished to find them acting, when the war began, as the direc
tors of a great life insurance company might act, if a city
had burned, and they had been so complacent as not to have
provided a sinking fimd."^0

Egan was especially irritated

■when he asked the representative of one western business firm
whose exports from Germany amounted to over |32 million an

nually, why he had not kept in closer contact with the Ameri
can Ambassador in Berlin.
ly, grated on Egan.
plied,
^o-rrow.

The businessman's answer thorough

'’Ambassadors are ornamental,f< the man re

"and political appointees are here to-day and gone toBecause you are an ancient 'hold over, ’ do not put

■|^n airs! = If you can’t help us, I suppose our consignment of
||16,000,000 of goods can not be got out of Germany!

It is

unfortunate that Egan never mentioned the names of the men or
Companies with whom he had such dealings •
Generally there was little that Egan could do directly
to help American businessmen.
vailing mood of the fanes.
i k |m ;f
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Everything depended on the pre

In self-preservation they had set
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*^Ten Tears, p. 293.
XI
Ibid.* Such remarks underscored E g a n 3s belief in the
weakness and fallacy of the United States dip.loin.atic service
at that time» He had long contended that the Foreign Service
desperately needed to be overhauled because frequent changes
in administrations iaade politically appointed diplomats only\
temporary fixtures without authority and unable to command
any respect — this in areas where .men of considerable skill
were needed* Egan wrote many articles on the subject and was
to continue his campaign for a revamping of the Foreign Ser
vice after he retired.
See Epilogue.
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up an embargo which they alternately enforced or lifted de
pending on the pressure being exerted on them by the Germans
or the British.

Cargoes of cotton, tobacco* and meat belong

ing to American firms were often frozen in Denmark as a re
sult of this measure.
leased.

Egan kept busy trying to have them re

When conditions were favorable he had to act quickly.

When the embargo acted against American interests he had to
face the unpleasant task of explaining this to less than un
derstanding businessmen.
During, the period of American neutrality, Egan, who had
been Minister since 1907, became the Dean ■—
in length of service —

or senior member

of the diplomatic corps in Copenhagen.

Els position was quite ticklish since most of the diplomats
in the Danish capital were members of one of the two belliger
ent champs and during time of war were officially not on speakIng terras with one another.

The only place that the repre

sentatives o f the warring powers saw each other was in church.
So many of the diplomats in Copenhagen were Catholics that St.
Ansgar *s Catholic Church was referred to frequently as "the
diplomatfs .church.”

But, said,Egan, Count Szeehenyi of Aus-

.tria and Prince Wittgenstein of Germany "were always so deeply
engaged in "prayer that they would not see the French Minister
"^2
or the Belgian."'
Fortunately, Egan's genial personality
kept him on good- terms with all of his diplomatic colleagues,
including 'the German Minister, Count Prockdorff-Rantzau -i
ftcaaaaic.flUfltiMW W >* ia *x j ^ Tira.— Iit,iviiaMMnr*««m > « cfe,imam

^ 2 T o± d .

9

pp. 290-292.

'AmaMDmkrAa-^ua

"one of the most cynical, 'brilliant, forcible diplomatists in
Europe..n

Although he Infuriated other people, Egan found him

delightful.

In later years Egan remarked that ffX shall always

miss him. ' He is the kind of man whose society you covet on
this earth, because if all signs prove true, you are not likely to meet him in Heaven —

until late in Eternity!*1 J

■ In 1914- Egan had shared his colleagues* view that the
war* would he very short.
early stages.

Germany had the advantage during the

Along with Brockdorff-Kantzau and Szeehenyi,

Egan thought that the Germans would call an end to the fighting*jpnpe they had established a powerful position in the Hear
Eastpysinee the crucial.problem lay In the control of Bulgaria,
Serbia,, and Constantinople.

Once Egan realized the War would

be prolonged he became convinced that the United States would
inevitably, be drawn into It.

He also thought that .American

intervention, though undesirable, was probably needed to cur
tail the hostilities.

He voiced these sentiments In one of

his frequent letters to Roosevelt.

In September 1916, the

former President answered Egan in a truly classic example of
Roosevelt!an prose:
* Good Lord!
How I wish I could see you and
talk with you.. It Is.not advisable that I put on
paper, and still, less- advisable for you to receive,
a complete statement of my views at the present m o 
ment.
They are not only unfit to print, but barely
fit f o r .writing. 34u^
'
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■^ T e n Years, p. 270.
Count Szechenyi, the Austrian Min
ister, was”*also one of E g a n ?s closest frlends In Denmark's
Roosevelt to Egan, Hew York, September 14, 1916.
Letter on loan from Mrs. John Cramer.
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On .January 31» 1917? Germany announced its resumption of
unrestricted submarine warfare.

Although it seemed fairly cer

tain that Germany’s action would lead to the sinking of Amer
ican ships and provoke the United States* "Wilson made one last
effort to preserve peace.

On February 3? 1917? he called on

the neutral nations of the world to join the United States In
the peaceful sanction of breaking off diplomatic relations with
Germany.

Several western hemisphere nations, and later China?

complied- with the suggestion? but none of the European neu35
teals acceded to It.
These small countries were geographi
cally too close to Germany to risk taking such a step,

Further*'

more.au.,2^one was too eager to support any American proposal since
the ignited States had not been overly cooperative with the neutralg in recent years.

36

;

Denmark's reply, which Egan forwarded

to W i l s o n ,was somewhat representative of the neutrals' views:
I £ the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs,./
authorize you to communicate to your government
that in the opinion of the Danish Government the
position of Denmark both actually and formally/ is
so different from that of the United States that
it is not possible to draw an analogy from the one
to the other? and further that the three northern
governments are in consultation with one another
at Stockholm in order to fix on a basis of Inter
national law the attitude to be taken_by them on
account of the new German regulation,37

^ E a r l e y Hotter, The Origins, of the Foreign Policy of
ffAJ-son (Baltimore*?
pp.* 6T9~o2i .
~«
See, for examp 1 e , Foreign Relations Papers, The Lansing Papers,J£» p. 225; and~Parsign Relations Papers7 19'TST
Supp.7" p p • 0 9 S-6 9 7 ? in which the'~UnitegH"31ates declined to
take 'part in a neutral conference because the geographical
position of this country made its problems so very differ
ent from those of countries contiguous to the belligerents.
^Foreign .
R elations Papers, Egan to Secretary of State?

Congress declared war on April 6.

With this event ne u 

tral Denmark became even more important as*a listening post,
and Egan was asked to step up his intelligence gathering act
ivities.

For Egan and his small overworked staff that was im

possible.

So, Egan asked Seymour Beach Conger, the Associated

Press correspondent in Denmark, to help interview refugees,
38
particularly Americans, who had fled from. Germany."

Conger

was valuable because he had previous military and reporting
experience and as a newspaperman he could question persons who
were otherwise inaccessible to the legation staff.
able to gain little new knowledge for Egan this way.

Yet he was
Most of

refugees' information concerned food conditions in Germany
ig|id political news derived from reading the German newspapers.
R a n t e d there was a continuing shortage of money and personnel
Egan'-s health again began to be a problem, but numerous
Reports In the Department of State files indicate that a cer
tain amount of seemingly effective espionage and counterespi
onage work was carried on in Copenhagen.

The following tele-

.gram from Egan is just one example:
- I am informed that the English aeroplanes in
their last raid could not find the Zeppelin and
aeroplane stations, at T a n d e m in Slesvig but I
know exactly where they are.
It
sic j lies about one kilometer outside of Tondern to the
northeast between the railroad tracks and the

Tel. ITo. 439, Copenhagen, February 6, 1917.
For the responses
of the other European'neutrals, see Foreign Relation s Parers,
1917? Supp. 1, pp. 116-43, passim.
fen Years, p. 321.
This book contains only
a few
^
pages of Information regarding E g a n *s activities m Denmark
a f t e r 'the United States had entered the Ear.
«»i^iih
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road to Denmark.
It Is very easy to find on ac
count of the fortifications are obvious but the
station itself is not so easy~to see because of
the gray roofs.
It Is from this station that
most of the Zeppelins and aeroplanes go and come
from England.
It is safer than the one in Bel
gium and the other places farther south.39
Upon entering the War, the United States became highly
concerned over the need to control the large volume of trade
that Denmark was carrying on with Germany.

During the period

of -Its own neutrality, the United States Government had not
objected to the lucrative business which American firms were
•doing with the neutral countries of Europe.

It was no secret

that this trade helped Germany since American exports frequent
ly filtered into Germany, or at least substituted for the domest||C .products of European neutrals when their products were
shipped Into G e r m a n y . P r o m

1914 to 1917 the British had done

thei^y.bes# to control this trade, but the United States was too
powerful, a n d ,her good will too valuable for the British to risk
a rupture, and so the blockade of Germany could not be enforced
as- vigorously as all-out warfare would have required.

But when

39Foreign Relations Pacers, Egan to Lansing, Tel. N o .
792, Copenhagen, June 25$ 19*17
40
Thomas A. nailey. The Polio:/ of the United States To
ward the IIeutrals, 1917-19fS^TBal'tlmoraT942J7 pp. 3^-36"'.
lc'cFr3Tng”lio IkBTXey, the figures show that the countries that
were buying grain, notably Holland and Denmark, were selling
large quantities of their own. butter, eggs, and meat to Ger
many,
Official British statistics revealed that an annual fat
ration sufficient to supply 7,700,000 soldiers was being shipped
to Germany from the Northern Neutrals.
Hot only was fat one of
the most serious deficiencies of the blockaded Central Powers,
but the very cows that produced the butter were in large mea
sure fed with feedstuffs produced in the United States.
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the United States entered the War, her point of view became
that of a belligerent.

She was no longer primarily inter

ested in neutral rights or in trade profits.

She now turned

her full attention to winning the War,
Paced with this challenge, the United States changed
-her views on supplying neutrals during wartime.

Official pol

icy now dictated that American goods and those of the allies
should be used primarily for the war effort.

Only items that

were surplus to this requirement would be shipped to the neu
trals, and .then only if those nations guaranteed that the
■products they were given would not be used to help the Entente
3prwers,

Furthermore, the neutral nations were required to

ma^ke some of their shipping tonnage available to the United
^States and her allies as partial payment for the right to re3C^ive the 11surplus” items.
A carefully worked out rationing
-’V'
and tonnage agreement was necessary in order to secure these
guarantees from the neutrals, and in the meantime a virtual
embargo was placed on shipments to them.

By proclamations of

July 9 arid August 27, 1917s President Wilson enumerated a list
of products that could not be exported without a special li
cense, and such licenses were not given, with but few exceptions, for the Scandinavian countries*

41

The lengthy nego

tiations for the Banish shipping and tonnage agreements were
carried on in Washington, and finally on September 13, 1918,
an. agreement was reached.

Ibid*, p. 137.
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American officials felt an cm-

^ I b i d . , pp.

170-193.

Q6

largo, particularly on fee&stuffs and petroemn would limit
considerably the Banish dairy and fishing industries and so
prevent them from producing surpluses to supply the Germans.
They did not understand, however, that the complete cessation
of Denmark’s German trade would bring about a serious economic
A-z
dislocation, if not actual prostration, ^ Nor was the fact
.that 'the Danes were supplying more food to the British than to
the Germans considered seriously enough.

44

The .British, who

had earlier signed agreements with the Danes, had recognized
this situation and had been willing to allow a certain amount
4c
of-Banish trade with the Germans, ^
Wr*

Egan, fully appreciated the Dan e s f predicament,

caught as

they were ,he tween two warring camps, with each taking its toll
on-the Danish economy.

In repeated reports to the State De

partment, Egan stressed the fact that the Banes needed Amer
ican exports of petroleum and animal feed since the supplies
formerly obtained from Russia had been cut off and there was
danger that the Banish herds would be Irretrievably lost.
hf.
E g a n ?s request was made in vain.

But

On July 6, shortly after the embargo was established by
the United States, Egan was hospitalized for three months.
Finally ill health forced him to leave his post in Denmark and
he returned to the United States on December 16, 191T* where

1bid., p. 39
44lbid., pp. 42-44,
4-tSiney,
Si
op. cit., pp. 98-104.
46

See Chapter IV, p. 7 8 .

Recollections, p p . 312, 320-321
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he spent his time working to counteract German propaganda in
the United States.

It was chiefly for this purpose that he

wrote his hook Ten Years hear the German Frontier;
spect and a Warning in 1918.

1^—f 1

4?

mrr*1"•■arnrrii-wg’^ - m g f r

mtr‘

A Retro-

In it he stressed the baleful

effect of German influejice on Europe, particularly on*Denmark.
■He was deeply Impressed by the German propaganda effort among
the Scandinavian countries and he. wrote several chapters on
the Germans’ use of Kultur and. religion for propaganda pur48
poses.
He believed that the German propaganda in the United
States was slanted in the same direction.
During these months Maurice Francis Egan continued to be
Unite^ States Minister to Denmark, but on May 30, 1918, he re
alized, that his health would prevent him from resuming his
work In the near future so he offered his resignation to Presiden%yfJ4i.son and. Secretary Lansing.

The Administration accept

ed it^wjith regret, and on. June 5* 1918, the Department of State
Aq
officially announced to the nation and to the world
that
Maurice Francis Egan’s twelve-year term, the longest served by
50
any non-career United States diplomat at a single post,
had
come to an end.

4^Ten Years, pp. vii-viii.
I

r r r n ii ^ r r , n itihtw i i i i i n i i n n
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See5 for example, Chapter V I I , "Kultur as Patron of
Danish Letters”, and Chapter VIII, "The.Religious Propaganda” .
^•9Hew York Times, June 6, 1918.
^ G r a h a m K. Stuart, American Diplomatic and Consular
Practice, p. 260.

EPILOGUE
Egan's resignation from government service did not sig
nal the end of his public life.
in its direction.

It merely marked a change

Retirement from diplomatic duty enabled

him to return to his literary career, curtailed temporarily
by his stay In Denmark.
One last attempt was apparently made to bring Egan back
■.into diplomatic service, however, despite his ill-health and
^determination to remain retired from such work.

He was men-

^vticned.in Washington.circles in early 1919 as a possible
Jj'hoice for U.S. Ambassador tc Italy.

His selection would

^fhave been highly appropriate, of course, in view of Italy’s
% overwhelmingly Catholic population..

In April, however, Egan

told Joseph Tumulty, Wilson1s private secretary, that he was
definitely not interested In the post.

He suggested his

close friend Robert Underwood Johnson, also a writer, as a
worthy substitute.

Johnson received the post in early 1920,

presumably through Egan's influence, and served as Ambassador to Italy for the remainder of Wilson’s administration.

1

During the five and one-half years of his semi-retire
ment, Egan,busied himself by writing numerous articles and

*Jerome Elmer Murphy, Egan' s grandson, in interview
with author, February 1966.
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reviews for newspapers and magazines as well as three vol
umes of reminiscences:

Ten Tsars Hear the. German Frontier,

Confessions of a Book Lover, and Recollections of a Happy
w a u w a <u i.wrfogsiaufTiv ^ E sii■»:*y<» Mn ««Hatta*»^W jauK g*»a^n«g5g»»*tfcn«K »gBg3a»aBBH Br>m«ag> *

Life*

■Kwaa-fcU « <wtrrTMiLi» iijaii: tfa^ <>an^ ir ^ « r r ^ B c m i,ia a * o arM,j grisaaft.»«wwmtJi»ii<Ngi<a*Cte<Cg»<»

Sinee.he was considered an expert on European affairs,

his views on current diplomatic problems were especially
p
sought by the press, which frequently quoted him.
~Much of Egan's critical writing during his last years
• was concerned with the reform of the United States diplomatic
and consular service.

Egan firmly believed that "our country

.has suffered terribly by the haphazard appointments of in
experienced and untrained commissioners.'1”^

He even went so

farcin his reform campaign to ask, in September 1920, presi
dential candidate Warren G. Harding to consider the creation
v*pf a diplomatic and. consular service.

Egan remarked to the

.future president that although the consular service had im
proved. since Theodore Roosevelt's administration the diplo
matic ?service remained in a "deplorable state” —

especially

since the tenure of William Jennings Bryan as Secretary of
4
State.
.The editor of Collier s attested to Egan s success

2

See,* for example. Hew York Times, December 29 $ 19172
"The Danes Favor "the AllTei7rT"NeV York Times, November 3,
1918:
"Germans to Soon Seek Peac?TT"New York Times, Novem
ber .6, 1918:
"Danes Desire for Return of Schleswig” ; New
York Times t. January 26, 1919 * "Need for Education of Amer
ican Public in Foreign Affairs” ; New York Times, January 26,
1SH9:
"Need for Reform of U.S. Diplomatic Service” .
^Maurice Francis Egan* "Our Extraordinary Envoys," Col
l i e r 1e , Vol. 6 7 , Ho. 13 (March 26, 1921), pp. 7-18.
h
•I am indebted to Professor Richard B. Sherman for this
citation from the Warren G, Harding Papers at the Ohio His
torical Society, Columbus, Ohio.
Egan to W.G. Harding, Moun
tain Lake Park, Maryland, September 25, 1920.

in alerting the public about reforming the diplomatic ser
vice in a March 1921 article.

’’Nobody has been stirring up

the State Department more effectively/’ the editor wrote,
C EganJ7 is a useful man to have around at this moment

when we are 3ust beginning to realize that , . . an effi
cient State Department and competent ambassadors are needed
•

•
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Egan -also received many significant honors during this
period.

Two honorary degrees ‘were bestowed upon him.

&

He

was elected to membership in the American Academy of Arts
and Letters.

The National Institute of Arts and Letters

c ^ s e him as its president.

King Christian X of Denmark in

presented him with the highest Danish decoration that
nquld be awarded to a commoner 9 the Grand Gross qf the Order
o4|?j/Damiebrog.

Finally, in 1923 Egan became the first Amer~

Isjgan to be, given Denmark’s Order of Distinguished Merit.
The award was presented to recognize his services to that
small nation during World War I.
t Egan died on January 15s 1924, at the Brooklyn, New York

home of his daughter Mrs. G.A. O ’Reilly.

While he was eulo

gised throughout the eastern United States» perhaps the great
est compliments paid to him were those published by the Danish press.'

Representative of these remarks were the feelings

Spollier's, Vol. 67, Ho. 13 (March 26, 1921).
°Colurabia University, June 5, 1919, and St, John's College in June 1920, as reported in New York Times, June 5$
1919? and June 24, 1920.
In 1919 he^'aTso^gave" the commence
ment address at New York University.
New York' Times, June

expressed by Copenhagen*s Berlingske Tidendes
*

*
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It is of the greatest importance to a small
country that a great power's Minister demonstrate
love and sympathy toward the accredited nation.
Such a man was hr,
Egan, His death, therefore* is
a personal loss to
all of us.
It Is as though we
were mourning one of our own great sons,*
Maurice Francis Egan will always be remembered by his
relatives as an Important man —

close friend of Theodore

Roosevelt, prominent Catholic writer, presidential adviser.
Historians, however, will undoubtedly only give him honor
able mention as a minor American bureaucrat of Irish ancestry
who was linked with the United States* acquisition of the
virgin Islands.

But all who closely examine his life —

whether they are blood relations or impartial observers —
.ikktX understandably wonder how a man who had no political

base, who did not represent a block of votes, and who had no
fevers to give could achieve even the limited success in gov^rninent which Egan did,

After all, whatever limited voter

influence he ever may have had

ended in 1888 when hequit

the Freeman's Journal.
■prwrrn'rn winnr-n ~r, in

— in m r n

•■"'Egan*s likable personality was a primary factor in his
success,*but more than anything else Egan was lucky,
knew the right people

He

Richard Watson Gilder, Senator Thom

as Garter, Theodore Roosevelt, for example ~~ In the right
places at-the right time and was able to capitalise on his
fiv f
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’Berlingske Tldende, January 16, 1924, as quoted in Hew
York Times, January 17* 1924*
The Times reported that prac
tically "all of the Copenhagen newspapers had articles on the
death of ’’one of Denmark *s best friends.”
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acquaintanceships.

His relationship with Roosevelt was par

ticularly crucial to his success.

Without the Roosevelt ap

pointment .to Denmark, Egan would have remained a witty minor
Catholic.writer and teacher who was occasionally invited to
White House social functions.

But Roosevelt, recognizing

Egan *s ability, gave him the opportunity to enter the diplo
matic world and use his skills.

Credit for E g a n 1s success

must also be given to Secretary of State Lansing, the source
•of. Egan's "ultimate break,"

Prior to Lansing, no one in the

.State Department had ever shown the least Interest in Egan's
efforts to reopen negotiations for the United States' purchase of the Danish West Indies.

Within five days after as-

sumtag. office, however, Lansing had discussed Egan's work
with President Wilson, and the two men had given-Egan the
w£$&-ahead" to pursue the issue further, thus assuring Egan
a ipla'ce in American history as one of the first Catholic Amer
icans qf-Irish ancestry to gain some prominence in the service
of the federal government.
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Historians who have written about Egan, I.e. Charles Tansill
and-Allan Westcott, based their studies on these works even
-though E g a n ’s writings are frequently inaccurate *

Certain

of his facts and situations very obviously have been colored
to provide more reader interest.

Egan was, above all, an

entertainer.
The Tirgin Islands purchase was thoroughly detaiD.ed by
.Charles Dalian. Tansill.

His monograph and Robert Lansing* s

article in the Hew York Times Magazine are the best sources
of background information about the purchase fight.
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The

source of data about Egan1s part in the negotiations*

How

ever* it was the Frankfurter Zeitung nnd Handelsblatt, ex
tant copies of which were found in the Stadtbibliothek, Mainz
Germany* which helped to substantiate Egan* s theory that Ger
many by 1914- was no longer interested in securing the Danish
West Indies for herself,
Arthur L i n k ’s volumes on Wilson and the books by Ernest
K* May, Palle Lauring, Franklin Scott, and Marion Siney were
.extremely useful sources of background material about the
period Egan served as Minister to Denmark.

These books cov-

fered in reliable detail Wilson’s desire for continued United
ifStafes neutrality; problems in United States-Danish relations
-A

D e n m a r k i s internal difficulties —

political, economic, and

|tS0 cial; and the complications which arose between the United
S t a t e s and Denmark when the former entered the War.

Egan's

%ecliniiig years were most clearly detailed by the Hew York
**

Times,

**
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1918-1924,

Throughout this paper there was no problem in research
ing *what Egan thought of himself, but there was a dearth of
information about the views his contemporaries had about him.
and his activities.

Such material can be found, however, in

the Archives of the University of Hotre Dame and Catholic
University and especially in the Theodore Roosevelt Papers.
Research in these archives would be necessary for a study of
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